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Abstract
The conflict in Northern Uganda is now in its 17th year. It pitches a 
rebel group, the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army, against the Ugandan gov-
ernment and against its own people, the Acholi. The robustness of the conflict 
as a semi-permanent feature of the Ugandan condition for such a long time 
indicates that the forces working against peace appear to be stronger than the 
forces working for it. To understand the conflict, the complex genesis of the 
Northern war must be understood. It must be adequately explained why the 
insurgency occurred at all, why it did not occur at an earlier time and why it 
persists to this day. These conditions, once clarified, must be complimented 
by an analysis of the character of the LRA rebellion itself, often oversimpli-
fied and described in terms of its assumed millenarian character (with refer-
ence to the biblical Ten Commandments). The following analysis will first 
establish a brief historical perspective to the conflict in the North. It will then 
analyze the emergence of the conflict in terms of root causes and situational 
factors, and look at the question why the LRA rebellion adopted the format 
it did and why the war persists for all these years. It will finally look at the 
question of what next.
In looking at the social disorder the NRM became heir to in 1986, the 
paper examines the root causes and advantageous circumstances that gathered 
force in a state of social turmoil without credible political leadership. It first 
traces the militarization of politics in Uganda, the increasing weight of the 
military in social and political interaction, and then looks at the progressive 
deinstitutionalization of politics, also considering the North-South opposition 
within the context of Uganda’s fragmented politics. While it is not correct to 
read this antagonism as a root cause, nor helpful to wield such a categoriza-
tion as framework for a causative analysis, since it is too ambiguous, it is 
important to understand it as a template to selectively interpret the intentions 
of others. To do this the paper looks through the template at the expressed 
grievances in relation to essential survival strategies. It then looks at the po-
litical vacuum that existed in Acholi society after the downfall of the Okello 
regime, and at a number of factors that facilitated the operational capacity for 
rebellion, which are the proximity of Sudan, the proliferation of small arms, a 
large Acholi Diaspora, and a substantial number of former UNLA troops.
The way out of the quandary took the shape of a deliverance couched in 
religious discourse. To that effect, the paper takes a closer look at how Alice 
Lakwena’s insurgence was configured. The emergence and transformation of 
the LRA can only be made comprehensible in its relation, even opposition to, 
the HSMF. Consideration of the genesis and downfall of the HSM helps us to 
look at the LRA as a radical structure of rejection: the extent to which it is 
or has been a movement to reconstitute the moral order and how war figures 
in it, and how its nature and composition have changed over the years. The 
paper argues that the LRA is a more conventional guerilla army than the 
HSMF ever was, but that the religious (millenarian) justification for violence 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 7
remains, if not dominant, extremely significant. In order to contextualize this 
violence, it is necessary to look at possible meanings of the wholesale use of 
terror. The final part of our argument contends that very quickly, as the char-
acter and composition of the movement evolved to include the wholesale use 
of terror and kidnapping of children, the LRA became increasingly ensnared 
in a series of internal contradictions that it has proven unable to master. The 
result is that through its actions, the LRA has exacerbated the process of de-
humanization it set out to counter.
Finally, the paper reflects on the reasons for the continuation of the 
conflict, which are many and deep. Basically there are three possible groups 
of answers, the support structure for the LRA, the problems the UPDF faces 
in fighting the war, as well as hidden motives, and all of these have a sediment 
of truth in them. 8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 9
‘Either they have done it, or it is being done to them’
                        Kacoke Madit 
Introduction
The conflict in Northern Uganda is now in its 17th year. It pitches 
a rebel group, the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army, against the Ugan-
dan government and against its own people, the Acholi. All parties to 
the conflict have demonstrated a brazen disregard for human rights and 
international humanitarian law. The mutilation and summary execution 
of non-combatants, the abduction of children and adults for use as foot 
soldiers, sex slaves and porters, the rounding up of civilians in camps 
– 1,200,000 by the end of September 2003 - have measured the cadence 
of this conflict with the regularity of a metronome. Despite the blustery 
rhetoric of the UPDF, ‘Operation Iron Fist’ has been unable to signifi-
cantly harm the LRA. Instead, it has brought the LRA rebels from their 
camps in Southern Sudan to permanent residence on the doorsteps of the 
Acholi population.
Apparently, the realities of this conflict seem far away from any 
Lord’s moral dictates. The rebels’ vision of an alternative society is poorly 
articulated to say the least, just as rampant atrocities undermine the cred-
ibility of the LRA as a popular political protest. The LRA has also proven 
remarkably resistant to military defeat. As one article puts it, “common 
wisdom used to be that the reason for the LRA’ survival was Sudanese 
sanctuary - but now it’s hard to see what the problem is. The LRA is just 
a couple of kids and a few fanatics, and they ought to be extracted pretty 
easily”1. This opinion reflects the two fundamental ideas invariably put 
forward in attempts to analyze the conflict: kids and fanatics. The presen-
tation of the war as being principally waged around children who need to 
be reintegrated or brought back under control diverts attention from the 
internal dynamics which sustain the conflict2. Demonisation of the LRA 
leadership is another well-frequented diagnostic route, conceptualizing 
terror in universal frames lacking fundamental explanations. Inevitably, 
terms as barbarism, savage, etc. do spring to mind when an explanatory 
framework seems to elude rational analysis. Yet few studies on terrorism 
focus exclusively on personality. The logic which concludes that heinous 
acts are heinous because the perpetrators are barbarians consigns the 
conflict to the dustbin of irrelevance. It is as good as saying that, apart 
from getting rid of the barbarians, not a lot can be done. Using terms as 
‘anarchy’, ‘chaos’, ‘uncivil wars’, (Kaplan 2000, Shawcross 2000) simply 
begs more questions and must be rejected in favor of an approach that 
analyses the conflict in light of the dynamics of social exclusion. For 
Baudrillard, ‘Evil’ means the principle of irreconcilability, releasing the 
‘energy of the rejected’ to undermine the virtual consensus that prevails3. 
What indeed are the ideas and communities of support behind the vio-
lence? Attempts to answer this and other questions must be grounded in 
1  Harman  Danna,  Terror  tag  shifts 
Uganda’s war, Christian Science Moni-
tor, p. 6, 26/08/2002
2  Dolan, C., Protracted conflict, elusive 
peace, initiatives to end the violence in 
Northern  Uganda:  Which  children 
count? The politics of children’s rights 
in northern Uganda, Accord, 2002
3  Baudrillard, J., The transparency of 
evil:  essays  on  extreme  phenomena, 
Verso, London/New York, 199310 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 11
a historic appreciation, without painting the issues in black and white. It is 
clear that the villagers who are trapped in the conflict zone cannot draw easy 
conclusions about who is right and who is wrong. As Afako states, “anyone 
could be subjected to the conditions that produced the perpetrators of the 
crimes experienced in the conflict”4. As with all conflicts, the reality is one of 
a series of dilemmas, and these must be reflected in the analysis. 
History does matter. It has been the tragedy of Ugandan politics that 
violence became a solution of first rather than last resort, in which every war 
can be justified since it is always embedded in a history of attack and coun-
terattack, of suffering and revenge. Uganda was a fragmented society in more 
ways than one at the eve of independence: religious, economic, racial, ethnic 
and linguistic divisions crisscrossed society. Yet we cannot assume a historic 
determinism that points from the various fault-lines at independence to the 
current North-South antagonism as its only logical conclusion5. At the core 
of the conflict lies the failure of subsequent Ugandan leaders to construct and 
consolidate a modern state that legitimizes and promotes collective aspira-
tions, and to wield the magnitudes and levels of power a modern state conveys, 
other than by divide-and-rule tactics. The perception of various communities 
that their environment was already violent, that they have been violated by 
the state, and that violent acts are therefore simply responses to the violence 
they have experienced, is a significant feature of Ugandan politics. According 
to the ‘Acholi’ , they have been singled out and treated by the current dispensa-
tion as a negative force, because of their numerical majority in Obote’s army. 
They were associated as a group with the excesses of that particular regime 
and forced to bear the guilt, unlike the architects of state security and govern-
ment policies or the civil service bureaucrats that profited economically or 
otherwise from the same regime. This has led to the emergence and consoli-
dation of an ‘Acholi’ nationalism expressed in terms that are antagonistic to 
the Museveni government and, in its more extreme manifestations, the Ugan-
dan state, when assertions of ethnic identity are made with uncompromising 
ferocity. Prophesies of suffering and retaliation have become self-fulfilling 
and self-reinforcing as the conflict takes its course, getting ‘locked in’ into 
the development of the modern Ugandan nation. Certainly, the 17 year old 
conflict has left a legacy of widespread economic and social damage, while 
the heavy-handed military tactics of the UPDF strengthen the perceptions 
among the Acholi that the Government ascribes little value to the lives of their 
children. A recent UN OCHA mission “noted with concern that UPDF state-
ments on the LRA refer almost exclusively to the ‘rebels’, even where those 
who may have died in clashes are very young children6” .
To a certain extent, Ugandan public opinion has been able to ignore the 
war for so long because it’s not on the road to anywhere vital, except towards 
more turmoil on the other side of the Ugandan-Sudanese border, and because 
the Nile and Lake Kyoga limit southward ‘contagion’. Also, the Acholi region 
does not hold known strategic reserves of any particular resources, as vast 
war-torn regions of the DRC for example do. In the future though, all that 
4  Afako, B., Reconciliation and 
justice:  Mato  oput  and  the  Am-
nesty Act, Accord, op.cit.
5  By use of the Miklukho-Mak-
lai  ethnolinguistic  fractionaliza-
tion  index,  one  can  easily  dem-
onstrate that, rather than being a 
‘bipolar’ country, Uganda ranks as 
one of the world’s most fractional-
ized countries, second only to the 
DRC5. This ethnic fragmentation, 
according to Collier, should actu-
ally be a factor in favour of a less 
conflict prone society (Collier, P., 
The challenge of Ugandan recon-
struction  1986-98,  World  Bank, 
20 p., draft November 1999).
6  OCHA  Regional  Support  Of-
fice for Central and East Africa, 
Mission  report  Uganda  9-11/04/
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may change as the oil wealth of southern Sudan will be unlocked, pending a 
peace settlement between Sudan’s government and the warring factions. To 
a certain extent, such a scenario has started to unfold as the sudden eastward 
spread of the LRA since July 2003 into the neighbouring districts of Teso is 
sounding distinctive alarm bells at the national level. As for now, the political, 
social, and economic marginalization of the three Acholi districts of Gulu, 
Kitgum, and Pader from mainstream development is distinctly measurable. 
On the one hand, the Acholi region, apart from Karamoja, is the laggard of 
the nation in terms of any basic human development indicator. Household 
incomes in the North when compared to the rest of Uganda are not only 
low.  The proportion of households below the poverty line actually increased 
from 1997 to 2000 contrary to other regions7. On the other hand, the Acholi 
community votes overwhelmingly anti-Movement, hence anti-Museveni, in 
local, parliamentary and presidential elections. During the 1996 presidential 
elections, the LRA even declared a unilateral ceasefire to allow people to 
campaign and vote for the Inter-Political Forces Coalition opposition led by 
Paul Ssemwogerere.
The following analysis will first establish a brief historical perspective 
to the conflict in the North. It will then analyze the emergence of the conflict 
in terms of root causes and situational factors, and look at the question why 
the LRA rebellion adopted the format it did and why the war persists for all 
these years. It will finally look at the question of what next.
Timeline of the conflict
To facilitate a close examination of the northern conflict, a familiarity 
with its main events is indispensable. Describing its history in meticulous 
detail is impractical considering the large number of events over a period of 
17 years. In the timeline presented in annex 1, we attempt to give a synopsis of 
the conflict and its main markers, with particular attention to the initial phase 
after 1986. This period, extraordinarily confused and volatile, is essential to 
appreciate the roots of the LRA rebellion8. Precision is not always possible 
and some of the timing is therefore indicative. Examples are the start of the 
Sudanese government support to the LRA, which may actually have started 
before the peace-talks episode in 1994 rather than after it, or the beginning 
of large-scale kidnapping. Even before 1991 some kidnapping occurred. The 
point here is to appreciate the aspect of escalation: what seems new is tied to 
an elemental change in conflict dynamics which may have been fermenting 
for some time. 
The timeline reveals three aspects of the conflict very clearly. First, it 
makes apparent the three-pronged strategy the Government has been follow-
ing, via the various reversals of strategy. These appear to be not so much 
reversals, as different aspects of the same overall strategy depending on what 
seems to offer the best chances of success: to apply substantial military pres-
7  Challenges  and  prospects  for 
poverty  reduction  in  Northern 
Uganda, MoFPED, March 2002
8  Kony’s  group  started  as  the 
Holy Spirit Movement, was then 
known briefly as the Uganda Peo-
ple’s Democratic Christian Army, 
to finally settle on the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 13
sure on the insurgents, to sow discord and thin out their ranks with offers of 
amnesty, and to revive the political process through negotiations. Sometimes, 
as in the early period of 2003, all three dimensions are in force simultane-
ously: an Amnesty Act is in place, and operation ‘Iron Fist’ is ongoing but 
suspended in one sub-county in Pader district to allow contacts between 
rebels and government. Even during the promising period in 1994, when the 
LRA and the NRM/A talked face-to-face, Minister of State for Pacification 
of Northern Uganda, Betty Bigombe, was directed to continue her initiative 
without compromising army operations, “which would continue as though no 
contacts were being made and would, in fact, be intensified to further weaken 
the rebels”9. In between the cracks of these reversals, as we shall see, lie as 
many missed opportunities for peace. The various reversals give the conflict 
a cyclical quality. A certain feeling of déjà vu, of history simply repeating 
itself without a single notch gained on the learning curve, is not altogether 
unfounded. Large military operations such as ‘Operation North’ and ‘Iron 
Fist’ have repeatedly proven disastrous in escalating the conflict and exacer-
bating the humanitarian situation, yet are trotted out at regular intervals as the 
‘final blow’ to the insurgency. Announcements of deadlines for victory, which 
came and went, have repeatedly been made by the GoU. And just as Salim 
Saleh, commander of the Reserve Force of the UPDF figures prominently in 
the Presidential Peace Team now, and Museveni is encamped in Gulu, so did 
Saleh get the brief in 1995 to end the conflict by any means, and did Museveni 
relocate to Gulu to supervise military operations. 
Second, although the parties to the conflict have basically remained 
unchanged since 1988, their character and composition are dynamic. The ebb 
and flow of the conflict cycle is typified by various escalations. These escala-
tions are marked by the start of Operation North in January 1991, the collapse 
of the peace talks in February 1994, the vote to escalate the conflict by the 
6th Parliament in January 1997, the conclusion of the Nairobi peace accord 
between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda in 1999, and the start of Op-
eration Iron Fist in April 2002. Most of these ‘markers’ entailed an important 
change in the dynamics of the conflict. All in all four distinct periods can be 
characterized. The first is from 1986 to 1991; it is marked by the simultaneous 
existence of several Acholi insurgent groups, apart from the UPDA drawn to 
non-conventional ‘holy spirit’ tactics, and the decisive ascendancy of Kony 
by the end of 1988. Although Alice Lakwena’s father, Severino Lukoya, at-
tempted to occupy the void created by the defeat of the HSMF in 1988, it was 
Kony who managed to fill the political vacuum. In the wake of Operation 
North in 1991, which marked the start of the second period, Kony accelerated 
the wholesale use of terror against civilians he then started to accuse of col-
laboration with the NRA. This period came to an end in early 1994, with the 
peace talks led by Betty Bigombe. After the failure of the negotiations, the 
LRA re-emerged as a ‘freelancer’ for the Sudanese government (GoS), which 
used the LRA in its fight against the SPLM/A, itself openly supported by Mu-
seveni. This period, which lasted until 2002, indicates a marked escalation of 
the conflict. The Northern conflict became embedded in regional dynamics; 
9  O’Kadameri,  B.,  LRA/
Government  negotiations  1993-
94, Accord, op.cit12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 13
the GoS secured Kony’s logistics rendering the conflict more lethal with the 
introduction of more powerful and sophisticated weaponry such as landmines 
and rocket-propelled grenades. At the same time the mass-abduction of chil-
dren to be trained and ‘re-socialized’ in rear-bases in southern Sudan grew to 
be the trademark of the LRA. Throughout this long period the conflict experi-
enced spikes, such as the particular intensive strikes by the LRA from 1997 to 
1999. Finally, the Nairobi peace accord between the governments of Uganda 
and Sudan in 1999 signals the commitment - in theory - of both governments 
no longer to support opponents of each other’s regime. Within a week of sign-
ing the agreement, which stipulates in point 3 the provisions to disarm and 
disband ‘terrorist groups’ (by implication the LRA), the LRA launched new 
attacks10. More recently, a separate protocol allowed the UPDF to launch op-
eration ‘Iron Fist’ in April 2002 against LRA bases in Southern Sudan. This 
operation marked the end of a relatively peaceful period. The rebels, who 
had crossed back into southern Sudan with the outbreak of the Ebola crisis 
in Gulu in 2000, were now forced back into Northern Uganda and intensified 
attacks, causing an unprecedented intensification of the humanitarian crisis. 
The third aspect of the conflict is that, however much we would like to 
paint Kony as evil incarnate, terror as an instrument of war is neither a Kony 
invention nor monopoly. What is new is not the nature of the violence, but its 
scale. Even the distinction between victims and perpetrators is not as cast-
iron as some rudimentary analysis would make it appear; some people have 
been involved in this conflict at various times as rebel, at times even different 
rebel groups such as the HSMF and the LRA, army soldier, and civilian. Ter-
ror has been used throughout the conflict by all parties, including the various 
Acholi insurgent groups against their own people. In early 1987, as the HSMF 
mobilized the population and received substantial donations in kind and cash, 
the UPDA feared for the security of their logistics and punished the popula-
tion extremely viciously for its support of the HSMF. The HSMF is known 
to have organized ‘Operation Coy’ in July and September 1987 to flush out 
soldiers and supporters of the UPDA, many of whom were killed with ma-
chetes. The Kony rebels attacked various brigades and even the headquarters 
of the UPDA in 1987, and there was bitter rivalry between Kony and Alice 
Lakwena after Lakwena ridiculed Kony during his visit to Alice’s temple in 
Opit in early 198711. The NRA as well is not free from accusations of terror-
izing the Acholi population. Latigo asserts that elements of FEDEMU, based 
in Tororo, were deployed to the North in 1986 and exacted a great deal of suf-
fering and death on captured UNLA soldiers and civilians12. In one notorious 
case in August of 1986, 40 people were murdered in Namokora in Kitgum, 
the home village of Tito Okello13. Other infamous events are the executions 
by the NRA of 97 civilians at Kona Kilak in July 1987 and of 40 civilians at 
Koch Goma in June 1988. Judging from a report by the Acholi members of 
Parliament, ‘Operation North’ provided no relief: people were buried alive by 
the NRA and soldiers of the NRA mobile battalion ‘Gunga’ raped men and 
women in the presence of their families14. The impact was such that the rape 
of men subsequently came to be known in Acholi as ‘tek gunga’ . 
10 Nairobi  Agreement  between 
the  Governments  of  Sudan  and 
Uganda, 8 December 1999, point 
3.
11 Behrend,  H.,  Alice  Lakwena 
& the Holy Spirits, James Currey, 
Oxford, 1999, 210 p
12 Kacoke Madit, 1997, op.cit.
13 Lamwaka C., The peace proc-
ess  in  Northern  Uganda,  AC-
CORD, op.cit.
14 Human  Rights  Watch,  The 
scars of death: children abducted 
by the LRA in Uganda, Septem-
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Analysis of the conflict
The genesis of the Northern war is complex. We must adequately ex-
plain why the insurgency occurred at all, why it did not occur at an earlier 
time and why it persists to this day. However disagreeable this may seem, it 
is important to try and look at the war from the other side of the looking glass 
as it were, broadening the perspective rather than enlarging particular as-
pects and blurring the rest. Is Kony a vehicle for those social forces that have 
bedeviled Uganda and made it prone to conflict, or is it the other way round? 
These conditions, once explained, must be complimented by an analysis of 
the character of the LRA rebellion itself, often oversimplified and described 
in terms of its assumed millenarian character (with reference to the biblical 
Ten Commandments). 
To do so we will first look at the root causes of the conflict, the deep-
rooted factors that provoked an attempt to alter the status quo by violence 
rather than by political means. Then we analyze the situational factors in-
volved, the factors that facilitated the waging of war, to conclude with an 
appreciation of the format the rebellion finally adopted.
Root causes
First, in looking at the social disorder the NRM became heir to in 1986, 
we trace the militarization of politics in Uganda, the increasing weight of the 
military in social and political interaction. Uganda’s post-colonial experi-
ments of state-building were based on the army as an instrument of domestic 
politics. Domestic politics itself was increasingly a function of ethnic retali-
ation. This not only hardened ethnic boundaries, but created a sizeable and 
almost unemployable class of lumpen militariat, which solidified violence as 
a means of interaction in society. We then look at the progressive deinstitu-
tionalization of politics. By the time the NRM took over, personalized rule 
and the absence of institutional channels to challenge the government other 
than by force and at the peril of one’s life had become entrenched. After the 
NRA victory, an immediate administrative and later legal ban on political ac-
tivities made it unfeasible to challenge the authority of the NRM, and an ini-
tial attempt to set up a broad-based Movement government of national unity 
crumbled under mounting differences. Even had there been a genuine and 
lasting political opening, in 1986 the Acholi had no credible representative on 
the political front to symbolize their voice. We then consider the North-South 
opposition within the context of Uganda’s fragmented politics. We argue that 
while it is not correct to read this antagonism as a root cause, nor helpful to 
wield such a categorization as framework for a causative analysis, since it is 
too ambiguous, it is important to understand it as a template to selectively 
interpret the intentions of others. To do this we look through the template at 
the expressed grievances in relation to essential survival strategies.14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 15
Militarization of politics
At the core of Uganda’s post-colonial political development lies a dou-
ble dilemma. On the one hand security forces acquired lives and identities of 
their own, with civilian control non-existent. Even in 2002, the Porter Com-
mission mulls over “a deliberate lie by Uganda’s Acting Army Commander, 
displaying an arrogance and contempt of civil authority similar to that which 
has been displayed by other witnesses in the UPDF”, to conclude that “the 
UPDF appears to do whatever it likes, even when specifically told not to by 
its Commander in Chief”15. On the other hand, competition over which ethnic 
group would form the constituent core of the security forces drove a history 
of violent political change.
In theory, defense is an archetypal public good, meaning people cannot 
be excluded from its enjoyment. The modern nation-state is at once the refer-
ence point for its production and consumption: it establishes a national army, 
while its geographical boundaries indicate the boundaries of enjoyment of 
this public good. In practice, Uganda’s modern history has been an example 
of the state using its authoritative mechanisms to identify and exclude from its 
enjoyment groups of people that are comprised within the national bounda-
ries. This history of marginalization has been driven by the selective com-
position and use of the army, turning the military into a vehicle of domestic 
politics: “All successive regimes in Uganda have grossly misused the military 
to achieve their selfish aims”16. In the Uganda scenario, where the state be-
came the instrument of violent retaliation in the arena of domestic politics, the 
military turns out to be a public good for some ethnic groups but a public bad 
for the ‘internal outsiders’; they cannot exclude themselves from the destruc-
tive impact of the public bad. The situation, as in Uganda’s case, becomes 
more destructive as the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, those 
ethnic groups that experience the military as a public good or bad, radically 
shift over time. The following concise overview is particularly concerned 
with examining the competition, since the birth of the Ugandan state, for the 
exclusive claim over the country’s security forces. Initially, such control was 
subject to a political struggle. Since Amin’s coup in 1971, the question of who 
controls the composition of the army and the use to which it shall be put has 
been subject to a military struggle. In theory, the elections of 1996 brought 
this competition back to the political realm, although the ‘big tent’ system of 
the Movement, as the National Resistance Movement has been re-christened, 
narrowly demarcates the options.
It is common knowledge that the Obote I regime inherited from the 
British after independence a colonial army composed of mainly low-skilled 
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, West Nile)17. Obote I (1962-71) lost no time in 
launching the post-colonial tradition of using the army to alter the political 
status quo by selective state-sponsored violence. He suppressed the political 
power of mainly the Baganda by ousting the Kabaka and by abolishing not only 
federal institutions gravitating around Buganda but the other kingdom-states 
15 Republic  of  Uganda,  Judicial 
Commission of Inquiry into alle-
gations into illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and other forms 
of wealth in the DRC, final report, 
November 2002, p.33 and 120
16 Obita  Alfred,  Kacoke  Madit, 
1998
17 For  purposes  of  analysis, 
Uganda  is  often  divided  into 
three  groups:  the  ‘North’,  domi-
nated  by  Luo  and  Nilotics,  but 
which also includes Hamites such 
as  the  Iteso  and  Karamajong; 
the  ‘Centre’,  dominated  by  the 
Bantu-speaking  Baganda  and 
Banyoro; and the South and West, 
dominated  by  the  Bantu-speak-
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as well. After the overthrow of Obote I, General Amin (1971-79) changed the 
composition of the army radically in favour of his own people (Kakwa and 
Sudanic people) by mass murder of the Acholi and Langi contingents. The 
army was then used to weed out dissidents using widespread state-sponsored 
terror. After the Tanzanian Army invasion, a Military Commission (1979-
1980) presided over an extraordinarily fluid period. Acholi and Langi soldiers 
went on the rampage in West Nile to avenge the former Amin killings. Amid 
reports of fraud, Obote was returned to power in an election in 1980. This did 
not end the period of extreme instability and mass murder, but resulted once 
again in a radically altered composition of the army, returning the Acholi and 
Langi to a position of prominence. The UNLA as it was now called, then pro-
ceeded to fight various insurgencies not only via military confrontations, but 
especially by targeting their popular bases wielding terror as an instrument 
of war. Obote’s main concern was the NRA led by Museveni, the Secretary 
for Defense of the previous Military Commission. The NRA, which consisted 
mainly of Banyankole and ethnic Tutsi from Rwanda, nevertheless enjoyed 
the support of other ethnic groups such as the Baganda.  An Acholi General, 
Tito Okello, disgruntled with the higher status Obote had seemed to bestow 
on his Langi tribesmen in the army, deposed Obote in a coup in 1985. Upon 
seizing power, Tito Okello urged all political parties and insurgent groups 
to join the new government, i.e. Military Council. The NRA/M refused to 
join, and between August and December 1985 Okello and the NRA/M dis-
cussed and concluded peace in Nairobi. Museveni nevertheless continued his 
military campaign. In January 1986, the NRA seized Kampala and Museveni 
came to power by decree as Uganda’s eight President, the sixth consecutive 
leader in a period of  a mere 7 years. For the first time however, socio-eco-
nomic, political, and military power were all concentrated in the south. Vio-
lence typified the social turmoil in the North after the NRA take-over. In 
January and February 1986, the retreating UNLA mobilized and armed the 
local population of Gulu and Kitgum to resist the advancing NRA by force. 
This attempt was defeated and in March the NRA took effective control of 
Gulu and Kitgum towns. Problems were compounded by the integration into 
the NRA of other irregular troops with a poor reputation, such as FEDEMU, 
and their subsequent posting to the North, which mirrored earlier troubles of 
UNLA soldiers’ misconduct in the Luwero triangle. The UPDA meanwhile 
had re-entered Uganda from Sudan and started a guerilla war. In the East, the 
Iteso organized the UPA to wage their guerilla war against the NRA
Two points are important to note from this synopsis. First, the frequent 
changes of composition of the Ugandan military, combined with its tendency 
until recently to attract mainly low-skilled persons, led to a sizeable ‘lumpen 
militariat’ , a class of ill-trained soldiers and officers with no discernible skills 
and very low discipline18. Recently, with regards to the current UPDF, the 
report of the Porter Commission is informative in its conclusion that there 
is “a deep-seated indiscipline throughout the UPDF which requires further 
investigation and a full review of the capability, discipline, and honesty of 
officers”19. It goes on to recommend towards the Defence Review “a care-
18 Kandeh,  J.,  What  Does  the 
‘Militariat’  Do  When  it  Rules? 
Review  of  African  Political 
Economy,  Vol.  23  No.  69,  Sep-
tember 1996, pp387-404
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ful assessment of the ability, intelligence, and educational achievements of 
particularly, officers. Some of those who have given evidence before this 
Commission have barely been able to make themselves understood, even to 
the rank of Major” , and “a stringent examination of the capacity of the officers 
to fill his office as a professional soldier”20. It is important to appreciate that 
this problem is but the present emanation of an old sore which stems from the 
earliest days of the modern Ugandan state and the formation of its national 
army. In his informative autobiography, Rwehururu for example, a Major in 
Amin’s army who went into exile and launched a rebellion in West Nile in the 
early eighties under FUNA (Former Uganda National Army), expends pages 
to clarify how uneducated army privates and assorted types from West Nile 
region swiftly rose through the ranks of Amin’s army; among them a prison 
service tractor driver (Gowan) who became Chief of Staff by the time Amin 
was ousted21. These were a problem both in and out of the army, frequently 
degenerating into gangs of thugs. Many Ugandans today still remember the 
6 month reign of Tito Okello for the way the lumpen militariat divided and 
ruled the streets of Kampala in an atmosphere of total lawlessness. Collier 
finds that the best proxy measure for the opportunity cost of rebellion is the 
endowment of human capital22. In other words, the less educated people are, 
the less they have to lose by waging rebellion. As we shall see, the return of 
many of these former UNLA soldiers to their villages in Acholi as they re-
treated north after the NRA victory was part of the trigger of the insurgency. 
Predictably, a subsistence economy under duress unable to absorb a large 
influx of low-skilled labour implies a low opportunity cost of participating 
in rebellion. Apart from weapons handling, most retreating UNLA soldiers 
were unskilled and unable or unwilling to adapt to regular village life, and 
formed a fertile recruitment ground for the UPDA, the HSMF and Kony. Sol-
diers seemed to join new rebel groups at the spur of the moment without any 
sense of purpose. The entire autobiography for example of Colonel Rwehu-
ruru does not reveal any purpose of that rebellion, other than that “launching 
such a war would serve as an announcement to the world that we were very 
much alive and active”23. 
Second, Amin’s order for Acholi and Langi officers and enlisted men 
to return to barracks only to be massacred, firmly introduced competitive 
retaliation on an ethnic basis. The genie has proven difficult to put back in the 
bottle. Uganda’s modern history for 25 years had been one of ethnic cleans-
ing and reprisals. Generally speaking, a state authority that seems unable or 
unwilling to guarantee the security of all citizens, but rather uses the army 
selectively to further its own political and security agenda at the expense of 
some ethnic groups, forces the latter to ensure their own security. In return, 
ethnic boundaries have hardened in a self-reinforcing process of increasing 
mutual distrust. Each group is led to formulate a worst-case analysis of the 
others’ intentions, while demagogic leaders dominate the political space by 
selectively using the historical record to drive the analysis. The UNLA had 
not been illustrious for its discipline, especially in the Luwero Triangle while 
battling the NRA. In 1983, under the cover of ‘Operation Bonanza’ , Obote 
20 Porter,  op.cit.,  recommenda-
tions re. UPDF and the ongoing 
Defence Review, No. 44.4.1 and 
44.4.2, p. 203
21 Rwehururu, op.cit., p.55-62
22 Collier,  P.,  The  challenge  of 
Ugandan reconstruction 1986-98, 
World Bank, 20 p., draft Novem-
ber 1999
23 Rwehururu,  B.,  Cross  to  the 
Gun, Monitor publications, 2002, 
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unleashed the UNLA to wreak havoc on the local Baganda population. The 
ICRC claimed that no less than 300,000 people died and that a third of the 
region’s population could not be accounted for by 1986. After the capture of 
Kampala, the NRA was busy consolidating its victory throughout the country 
and integrating former opponents into its ranks. In the situation of consider-
able anarchy that prevailed, Baganda agitated violently against the Acholi 
and Langi who were trapped in the south. Now the Acholi feared it was only 
a matter of time before Museveni’s soldiers opened the floodgates of revenge. 
Those that fled north brought rumors of ethnic retaliation, endorsing the 
reading of a worst-case scenario and catalyzing support for a newly formed 
insurgent group based in Sudan, the UPDA. 
Driving this narrative of attack and counterattack lays the issue of dis-
trust, a feeling of ‘betrayal’. To understand the insurgencies in Acholiland, it 
is important to see what the nodes of the growing distrust were, and how they 
found concrete expression in a selective reading of the intention of others. Out 
of the accounts of betrayal of the Acholi by the ‘national’ government, three 
points stand out24. The UPDA reflected each of these elements in the griev-
ances it brought to the negotiation table in 1987. First was of course Amin’s 
order in 1972 for all troops to report to barracks, only for the Acholi and Lan-
gi enlisted men and officers to be massacred. Many Acholi believed to hear 
an echo of this experience when the NRA ordered Acholi people to lay down 
their arms and ordered UNLA soldiers back to barracks in 1986. It didn’t help 
matters when the ex-soldiers who did respond to the order were indeed de-
tained and severely mistreated, and sent to re-education camps in the south25. 
Second, and cited in the 1998 Bedo Piny as well as in the 1997 Kacoke Madit 
meeting, was the contravening by the NRM/A of the Nairobi Peace Accord of 
1985: “The Acholi paved the way for Museveni by overthrowing Obote, and 
Museveni paid us back by betraying us”26. Finally, contrary to NRM assur-
ances and at a time when goodwill was at a premium, the 1988 peace treaty 
between the NRM and the UPDA was followed by major military operations 
to ‘annihilate’ the remaining rebels27. Part of the strategy of the 1988 coun-
ter-insurgency campaign was to deny the rebels access to food by destroying 
civilian food stocks and domestic animals. What is more, on suspicion of 
plotting a coup, a number of renowned ex-UPDA rebels such as Mike Kilama 
were killed or arrested and perished later in prison28. The civilian population 
suffered extreme brutality at the hands of the NRA during this period.
Deinstitutionalization of politics
The core of the colonial experience in Africa is the same as elsewhere: 
effective foreign conquest requires establishing, maintaining, and stabilizing 
control over the social and political order of indigenous societies, by involv-
ing a system of active local auxiliaries. In this, Uganda’s colonial experience 
has its own historical particularities. Independence found Uganda with an 
entrenched racial division of economic function and privilege, keenly felt 
24 Heike  Behrend  includes  an 
event  in  1913,  when  the  British 
finally ‘pacified’ the Acholi with 
the  defeat  of  the  Lamogi  rebel-
lion. The Acholi were promised 
that they could keep their rifles 
after registration, only to find that 
these were then publicly burned;   
Behrend,  H.,  Alice  Lakwena  & 
the  Holy  Spirits,  James  Currey, 
Oxford, 1999, 210 p., p.17
25 Nyeko, Accord, op.cit.
26 Quoted in De Temmerman, Els, 
Aboke girls: Children abducted in 
Northern Uganda, Fountain Pub-
lishers, Kampala, 2001, p.108
27 An  interesting  side  note  here 
is that Kony had requested in a 
letter  to  NRA  colonel  Kuteesa 
to initiate talks with the NRA at 
the same time as the UPDA. The 
initiative  collapsed  when  NRA 
mobile forces attacked Kony be-
fore talks could begin.
28 Lamwaka,  C.  H.,  Civil  war 
and the peace process in Uganda 
1986-1997, East African Journal 
of  Peace  and  Human  Rights, 
Makerere  University  Human 
Rights  and  Peace  Centre,  vol.4 
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religious divisions, and a widespread resentment of preferential treatment ac-
corded to the Baganda, in contrast to British policy towards northern Uganda. 
The northern region served mainly as a reservoir for cheap labour, from which 
Britain recruited its soldiers. Uganda’s post-colonial attempts to adopt social 
transformative goals and create new political structures for popular mobiliza-
tion rapidly ran into obstacles posed by the colonial legacy: tensions between 
a developed center and underdeveloped north, northern dominance of the 
military, and full or partial federal status for a number of southern kingdoms.   
By 1969, Obote had not succeeded, if that was his intention in the first place, 
in transforming the UPC from an anglicanized mainly Langi dominated or-
ganization into a broad-based mass political party. Rather he abolished the 
1962 constitution, the four southern kingdoms, banned all opposition groups, 
and strengthened his executive powers. In so doing, he effectively deinstitu-
tionalized politics; the expression of political dissent was driven into extra-
institutional avenues. The trend towards central authority, personalized rule, 
and coercive strategies to deal with any challenges to central authority was 
further magnified and entrenched in all subsequent regimes.
How did this context evolve once the NRM seized power in 1986, es-
pecially as regards the North in those early days which were so crucial to 
the genesis of the northern conflict? After all, Museveni did go to the bush 
because he felt there were no available institutional means to address people’s 
concerns with the state, justifying his bush-war as more than a struggle for 
power. The ten-point programme of the NRM clearly established a vision of 
a more democratic and representative form of governance. How feasible was 
it in practice to challenge the authority of the NRM, and how broad-based 
was the attempt to set up a government of national unity? In the early NRM 
period, the unelected National Resistance Council was established to govern 
during an interim period scheduled to last not longer than 4 years, during 
which a ban on political party activity would be in effect. In 1989 Museveni 
extended the interim period for another 5 years. Later, this administrative ban 
on political activities other than those tolerated by the NRM was translated 
into a legal ban. The Constitutional Assembly Election Act of 1993 specified 
that any candidate attempting to use sectarian grounds for election purposes, 
and sectarianism included political parties, would be disqualified. The ac-
tivities of political parties are still proscribed under the 1995 constitution29. 
One could therefore only engage in political activities within the tightly pro-
scribed NRM framework, which does not allow to politically challenge the 
framework itself, since doing so would require one to place oneself outside of 
the ‘big tent’ Movement and therefore, a fortiori, wide of the tolerable mark. 
The NRM was ready to effectively back up by force its restrictions on politi-
cal activity, as it demonstrated during a number of occasions when parties or 
civil society organizations attempted to hold rallies. In terms of inclusiveness 
of the new coalition government, initially Museveni did set up a coalition 
Movement government of national unity and a national army that included 
members of various former political and armed opposition groups. There 
were two drawbacks to this. 
29 The Political Organisations Act 
of 2002 placed restrictions on the 
opening of district offices and the 
organization of rallies and other 
gatherings  by  political  parties. 
Meanwhile,  the  National  Execu-
tice Committee of the Movement 
has recommended the freeing of 
political parties, although govern-
ment  considers  this  subject  to  a 
referendum, which in itself would 
be contrary to the inherent right 
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First, as one observer puts it while discussing the integration of sur-
rendering irregular troops into the NRA, ‘some ex-UNLA soldiers who sur-
rendered to the NRA were removed to remote detention camps in western 
Uganda. The courtesy that appeared to be extended to UMF and FEDEMU 
soldiers was not extended to the UNLA’30. Other sources confirm the abusive 
language and vilification of the Acholi by NRM heavies. It was mentioned as 
one of the sources of the northern conflict in the Bedo Piny peace meeting 
in 1998 (see timeline). Apart from apparent dissonants in creating an army 
of national unity that involved Acholi UNLA soldiers, there was a problem 
on the political side as well. There was no political Acholi movement to in-
tegrate. Tito Okello had been overthrown and fled the country. The Uganda 
People’s Democratic Movement (UPDM) based in London and led by Otema 
Alimadi, an Acholi, did not appear to be coordinated with the UPDA military 
wing, based in Sudan, nor did it enjoy widespread support from the Acholi 
people31. This political vacuum created opportunities for personalities such as 
Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony to proliferate, an aspect we will come back 
to later. In addition, whereas initially the NRM was broad-based, the coali-
tion grew narrower over time as partners such as the DP and UPC eventually 
withdrew, citing differences on - amongst other things - continuing instability 
in the North (note). 
In theory, the ‘big tent’ idea was set up to promote national unity. Its 
effect has been to neutralize or co-opt political opposition and cancel political 
difference, the very essence of politics. In the absence of original political de-
bate, the state becomes desocialized: society implodes into the state. The state 
no longer works on the basis of political decisions, but on the basis of ‘intimi-
dation, dissuasion, simulation, provocation, or spectacular solicitation’32.
The North-South divide
The North-South divide is not God-given. Politics has redefined and 
focused Uganda’s numerous differences and projected these onto a specific 
faultline. This however, does not deny the reality of the North-South antago-
nism as it now exists. So far we have argued that ethnic polarization is a con-
crete product of Uganda’s modern history: a highly fragmented society, built 
on a divisive colonial legacy, where the military came to control domestic 
politics and block all channels of popular political expression. As all ethnic 
identity, African ethnic identity is not a given but a shifting phenomenon that 
is contextually defined. Ethnographic histories for example of ‘the Acholi’ as 
a people show clearly how ethnic boundaries, and the understanding of them, 
formed and shifted over the years from a society where identity was origi-
nally defined in reference to the clan. The pattern of violent ethnic retaliation 
has firmly cast Uganda’s polarization as a North-South divide, and ‘locked in’ 
its boundaries as a reference point or template for the expression of grievance. 
Yet if groupings such as “tribe” or ‘ethnic group’ are not concrete categories of 
political behavior, how much more so for geographic entities such as ‘North’ 
30 Ben  Ochora  Latigo,  Kacoke 
Madit,  1997;  UFM/A  (Uganda 
Freedom  Movement/Army)  and 
FEDEMU  (Federal  Democratic 
Movement  of  Uganda)  were 
Buganda based rebel groups. Ac-
cording to Latigo in the same arti-
cle, ‘the latter had a particularly 
bad  reputation  for  harbouring 
Kampala thugs and criminals’ .
31  The UPDM leadership in exile 
were called ‘opportunists’ by the 
UPDA, and were excluded from 
the  negotiations  that  led  to  the 
Pece  peace  agreement  with  the 
NRM/A  in  1988.  Not  surpris-
ingly, the UPDM denounced the 
talks  and  concluded  a  separate 
peace agreement with the NRM 
in Addis Abeba in 1990.
32 Baudrillard, op.cit., 199320 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 21
and ‘South’. What then are the ‘northern’ perceptions of marginalization in 
referring to the antagonistic interaction between North and South? What are 
the elements that underlie perceptions of ‘the culture and society in northern 
Uganda being near total disintegration’?33 
In this section I want to show how these grievances find concrete 
expression in a selective reading of the intentions of the ‘significant other’, 
ranging from suspicions that government lacks a firm commitment to de-
velopment in the North to the belief that government is actively working to 
under-develop the North. More particularly, how social marginalization is 
expressed in terms of grievances concerning essential survival strategies. 
Within a subsistence economy, the use of all three production factors of land, 
labour and capital is closely intertwined and carefully calibrated to serve as 
economic and social coping mechanisms that affect the household as well as 
community level. Disabling the use of one, such as land, hinders the use of 
other factors and puts at risk the very existence of the household and, at the 
aggregate level, the community. To get a sense of these grievances, Acholi 
voices are important, and a number of arguments put forward at the Kacoke 
Madit (KM) meetings are very helpful in this regard. 
About land, Ochora Latigo, coordinator of the KM, has this to say: 
“There has been some speculation in East Africa that the Tutsi led rebellion 
is a master plan, with Uganda at the center, to establish a Tutsi nation. To 
some, this helps explain President’s Museveni’s reluctance to end the LRA 
rebellion. The continuation of the war can depopulate vast segments of Acho-
liland and prepare it for resettlement by ethnic groups in the South who are 
land-starved. This might sound far-fetched, but it is a topic of considerable 
distress among the Acholi community.”34 Traveling through the districts of 
Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, one is indeed struck by the ‘emptiness’ of the land. 
As the Gulu District Local Government Development Plan 2001-2004 estab-
lishes, a total of 10,301 sq. Km of arable land make up 87.4% of the district 
land area, yet less than 10% is cultivated yearly. The underlying fear is how 
land rights under a communal tenure system can hold up and be protected 
against encroachment by ‘foreigners’ in the face of depopulation and a seem-
ingly empty land35. Another contribution in the same KM meeting therefore 
calls for the constitutional recognition of Acholi customary communal land 
ownership regimes, grazing, and hunting commons as a key element in a de-
finitive peace settlement. In this regard, the fears expressed in Acholi about 
the current Land Act indicate mistrust about the intentions of Government on 
land ownership36.
In terms of labour, the GoU policy of assembling people in what are 
called ‘protected camps’ is understood with reference to the colonial policy 
of earmarking the northern districts as a labour reserve for the sugarcane 
and tea plantations. The so-called Secretary for External Affairs of the LRA 
at the KM meeting of 1998 stated that “northern Uganda is being prepared, 
moulded and steered to become the land of the illiterates (...). This region 
33 Phrase used by the self-styled 
spokesperson of the LRA, James 
Obita, at the Kacoke Madit meet-
ing of 1998.
34 This is a reference to the time 
Museveni  was  Minister  of  De-
fense in the Lule/Binaisa UNLF 
government.  He  recruited  some 
4000  people  in  the  UNLA,  a 
number of which were Rwandese 
Tutsi  refugees  from  established 
UNHCR  camps  in  Uganda.  Af-
ter  the  botched  parliamentary 
elections  in  1980,  a  section  of 
the  UNLA  recruited  earlier  by 
Museveni  joined  the  NRA  with 
their  equipment.  In  retaliation, 
the UNLA targeted Bahima and 
Banyarwanda  living  in  Luwero 
and Ankole, of which a total of 
30,000 perished (HRW, 97). The 
official  UPDA  grievances  also 
included  a  reference  to  ‘foreign 
elements of Rwandan refugees in 
the NRA and government’. 
35 These sentiments contain ech-
oes  of  Africa’s  experience  with 
land-grabbing  by  the  colonial 
powers, which generally did not 
recognize unoccupied land as be-
ing effectively owned.
36 Larubi,  Lucy,  Highlights  of 
‘conflict and means of livelihood 
research’,  in  COPE  working  pa-
per  32,  Peace  research  and  the 
reconciliation  agenda,  ACORD, 
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will definitely be the leading source of cheap, unskilled labourers, in fact 
slaves unless something is done urgently to reverse the trend”. In addition, 
the London-based Acholi Association (organizer of the KM) observed that 
the “policy of protected villages is converting self-sufficient farmers into 
destitute aid dependants” , a sentiment that is frequently echoed in discussions. 
In what seems to be a reference to the alleged abuses by the NRA mobile 
battalion ‘Gunga’, another submission to the KM meeting goes as far as to 
allege a deliberate policy of rape by hand-picked HIV-infested government 
soldiers. Even though these elements may figure prominently in the outlook 
of at least some Acholi, the Acholi are not blind to the effects the LRA tactics 
are inflicting on society. Other submissions in the same KM meeting also 
lay blame on the LRA in destroying the fabric of society and a generation 
of Acholi children, its future human resource base, by abducting them and 
turning them into traumatized killers by forcing them to the battlefield. From 
these various angles, the earlier noted finding that the best proxy measure for 
the opportunity cost of rebellion is the endowment of human capital, strikes a 
chord. Both LRA tactics and the government response of regrouping civilians 
are reinforcing a trend of bringing down educational standards in Acholi. 
As in many other subsistence economies in Africa, capital is accumu-
lated in the form of cattle. The near total destocking in Gulu and Kitgum 
districts is frequently referred to as one of the tragedies of the war. De Tem-
merman cites an Acholi voice as saying that “it was the ultimate proof of 
Museveni’s strategy to wipe out the people of the North. For the cows were 
everything to the Acholi: they were the basic source of their diet, they were 
used as draught animals, and they served as dowry and were used for the 
settlement of disputes”37. Westbrook, on the basis of an interim report by the 
Kitgum District Peace Initiative, asserts that the cattle population in Kitgum 
fell from 156,667 in 1986 to 3,239 in 1998 while, in the same period, the na-
tional  cattle population increased from 3 to 5.6 million38. The replacement 
cost of the plundered cattle herd alone is estimated at roughly 25 million US 
$39. Apart from serious economic consequences, it destabilized the social 
fabric as animal raising was the traditional contribution of men to the house-
hold welfare. The household economic burden now fell squarely on women’s 
shoulders, while men resorted to heavy drinking40. Destocking took place 
in several ways. People voluntarily surrendered some of their cattle to the 
troops of Alice Lakwena, on the basis of chits that would guarantee a refund 
once the HSMF took power. Second and more important was the tremendous 
hemorrhage of cattle from the local communities due to the cattle rustling 
activities by the neighboring Karamajong tribe and the NRA. A point high-
lighted by Behrend depicts the confusion regarding the identity of the cattle 
thieves, in noting an often repeated accusation that NRA soldiers disguised 
themselves as Karamajong cattle raiders. It is impossible ex-post to establish 
the degree of involvement of the NRA either in stealing or allowing others 
to steal Acholi cattle. The fact that the Karamajong had previously failed to 
enter Acholiland apart from the areas of neighboring clans in Kitgum, but 
were now able to reach Gulu district unimpeded, is enough proof of com-
37 De  Temmerman,  E.,  op.cit., 
p.109
38 Westbrook,  D.,  The  torment 
of Northern Uganda: a legacy of 
missed  opportunities,  The  On-
line Journal of Peace and Conflict 
Resolution, Issue 3.2/June 2000
39 Gersony,  R.,  The  anguish  of 
Northern  Uganda,  USAID,  Au-
gust 1997, p.27
40 ISIS-WICCE,  Women’s  ex-
periences  of  armed  conflict  in 
Uganda Gulu district 1986-1999, 
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plicity for many41. The fact that NRA Commander Fred Rwigema, an ethnic 
Munyarwanda and very close to Museveni and Kagame, held the post of Gulu 
Resident District Commissioner during 1987, convinced many once again of a 
‘Tutsi’ plot. A conviction that destocking was a deliberate government policy 
is therefore firmly entrenched, reasoning that it allowed the NRA to eliminate 
the most plausible endowment source for the continued sponsoring and hence 
possible escalation of the rebellion42. 
Looking at these arguments, perceptions of marginalization evidently 
present a picture of differentiation in Uganda that is not necessarily com-
plete or accurate. An exercise presented in table 2 and 3 in annex shows that 
the pattern of economic differentiation in Uganda is more complex than a 
straightforward North-South antagonism.43 Yet the ‘North-South’ divide has 
evolved as a template to selectively interpret the intentions of others. Some 
of the views represented above are extreme, tantamount to seeing the war as 
a plan to exterminate the Acholi. Not every person in Acholi would interpret 
the meaning of the war as a plot by the ‘Tutsi’ NRA (or UPDF) to extermi-
nate the Acholi as an ethnic group by confiscating their land, rendering them 
unproductive or subservient by obfuscating their literacy skills and infecting 
them with HIV, and eliminating their capital base by stealing their cattle. 
Vice versa, equally strong views may be expressed by ‘Southerners’. To give 
but one example of an opinion coming from a very influential ‘Southerner’, 
Lt. General James Kazini of the UPDF attributes the abuses of Acholi people 
by the UPDF to the pathology of Acholi society in general, stating that “If 
anything, it is local Acholi soldiers causing the problems. It’s the cultural 
background of the people here; they are very violent. It’s genetic.” 44. These 
are simply the most selective readings the use of the template can produce. In 
our analysis however it is not the accuracy of the arguments that matters, but 
rather the insights offered into perceptions and the type of latent mobilizing 
power they convey for an entire generation brought up in IDP camps.
Situational factors
What are the factors that facilitated attempts to alter what the Acholi 
saw as an untenable status quo by force rather than political settlement in the 
period the NRA took power? We look at the political vacuum that existed in 
Acholi society after the downfall of the Okello regime, and at a number of 
factors that facilitated the operational capacity for rebellion, which are the 
proximity of Sudan, the proliferation of small arms, a large Acholi Diaspora, 
and a substantial number of former UNLA troops.
Politics  abhors  a  vacuum.  The  first  element  that  enabled  rebellion 
rather than a political settlement of the Acholi with the NRM, was a leader-
ship vacuum in a situation of extreme upheaval. Tito Okello, unable to contain 
threats to his authority, had been discredited as leader and fled the country. 
The UPDA was based in refugee camps in Sudan, without clear coordination 
41 Human  Rights  Focus  (HURI-
FO),  Between  two  fires,  p.  5, 
February 2002
42 Personal  discussions;  For  a 
comparison  with  the  alleged 
complicity of the NRA in Kara-
moja cattle rustling in Teso, see: 
Oballel  Omoding,  Mukura:  les-
sons after 10 years, The Monitor, 
11/07/1999
43 The tables 2 and 3 give an over-
view per district of pupil/teacher 
and  pupil/classroom  ratios,  as 
well  as  the  percentages  of  the 
population that have access to a 
safe rural water supply. The fig-
ures are ranked and the districts 
of the North (West Nile, Acholi, 
Langi,  Karamoja)  are  high-
lighted, showing that there is no 
clearcut  pattern  in  which  north-
ern districts end up invariably on 
one side of the league table with 
the worst indices. The tables were 
adapted from table 3 and annex 3 
in: Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and  Economic  Development, 
Post-Conflict  Reconstruction: 
the Case of Norther Uganda, Dis-
cussion Paper 7 for the Consuta-
tive Group meeting of May 2003, 
April 2003 
44 Human  Rights  Watch,  op.cit., 
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with its political wing the UPDM, based in distant London. Both the UPDA 
and UPDM did not enjoy widespread support of the Acholi people: clan lead-
ers actually appealed to the UPDA not to start a war at home45. The UPDA 
consisted of a number of brigades, which were greatly expanded when former 
UNLA soldiers joined after the fall of Gulu and Kitgum. Once it did re-enter 
Uganda, the overall commander Odong Latek had difficulties coordinating 
and controlling his troops which operated in quasi-independent units. All 
told, the situation was without clear military or political leadership on the 
Acholi side.
It would be wrong to simply consider these facts as extraordinary coin-
cidences, Murphy’s Law on a bad hair day. Embedded in the leadership crisis 
loomed a deeper rooted generation-gap. The existing generation of Acholi 
leaders had been incapable of protecting Acholi interests, and showed little 
imagination in dealing with the crisis. When an Acholi managed to achieve 
state power, a first in Ugandan history, he was routed after a mere 6 months. 
The armed response fabricated by former UNLA elements was unimpres-
sive, badly coordinated, and by and large turned out to be little better in its 
malignancy towards civilians than the reported misconduct of NRA troops. 
The UPDM was entrenched in a far-off place, and could not genuinely claim 
to represent the aggregated political voice of the Acholi. Traditional leaders 
were unable to appease and exorcise the ‘cen’ (bad spirits) and witchcraft that 
plagued the land with the return of the UNLA soldiers after Okello’s fall, with 
escalating tensions between people as a result46. They also advocated heeding 
the call for the ex-UNLA soldiers to return to barracks, only to find that many 
of those who responded were maltreated or disappeared. Then the elders, hav-
ing anointed Kony, subsequently abandoned him. In a telling incident during 
the NRA-LRA peace talks of 1994, at one meeting LRA Commander Arop 
threatened to harm elder Anania Akera, “claiming that Akera was one of 
those who ‘pointed his penis towards the bush and cursed us’ - traditionally 
the ultimate curse a father can perform against his offspring” 47. According 
to the same source, Kony claimed in his meeting with Betty Bigombe on 11 
January 1994 that apart from three elders he could trust, “the others were 
bloodthirsty people who had failed to guide the people in Acholi in its most 
serious hour of need” . In this vacuum, Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony, 
young people in their twenties, stood up as leaders to offer a holistic solution 
that drew on the Acholi cultural archive to reinvent traditions of healing and 
cleansing (see further). In so doing they established a new social hierarchy 
that successfully mobilized the population during the late eighties. It was not 
until Alice Lakwena was well and truly beaten that Kony was able to hug the 
limelight by himself. 
In addition to a leadership vacuum, the combination of a number of 
elements directly supported operational capacity of insurgents in the North. 
First, the proximity of Sudan, a huge country with its own share of rebellion 
and tenuous or no government control of the southern part bordering Uganda. 
Such a situation allowed cross-border operations and establishment of safe 
45 Ochora Latigo, Kacoke Madit, 
op.cit.
46 Since  not  only  death  in  war, 
but also death from AIDS, which 
had spread to a terrifying degree 
throughout  Acholi,  was  inter-
preted in the idiom of witchcraft, 
Acholi  was  transformed  into  a 
land  where  everyone  suspected 
and tried to harm everyone else. 
For  accusations  of  whitchcraft 
not only reflect. But also generate, 
social tensions’ (Behrend, op.cit., 
1999, p. 27).
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havens and bases on Sudanese territory. Not only that. In the early nineties 
the SPLM/A, with direct US and Ugandan support and with Operation Life-
line greatly expanded in Southern Sudan, was regaining military ascendancy 
in Southern Sudan after years of damaging internecine warfare48. In retalia-
tion for GoU support for the SPLM/A, the GoS started to aid the makeover of 
what had been a motley group of rebels into a coherent, well-supplied military 
enterprise. The LRA and its use of terror in a way became the ultimate fifth 
column of the Sudanese army: a clandestine, cost-effective force used to 
destabilize the SPLM/A and Uganda. Until the signing of the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement for example, the LRA had a well-established permanent camp in 
Nsitu south of Juba and even an office in Juba town. 
Second, access to arms was easy, even before direct support to the LRA 
by the Sudanese government. The issue of arms proliferation is obviously 
greatly related to the quick succession of wars in Uganda and neighbouring 
countries, especially Sudan. The bulk of UNLA soldiers were not demobi-
lized but fled North with their arms, feeding these into the UPDA rebellion. 
Light weapons were also circulating freely in a regional market with wars 
going on simultaneously in Southern Sudan, Uganda, and the Horn (Eritrea, 
Tigre...), and with the regime in Somalia collapsing and flooding the market. 
A 2001 Oxfam report asserts that “the valley that runs between the Kidepo 
national Park and the Nangeye Mountains of Southern Sudan is the funnel 
through which small arms pour into Uganda”. Desertions by members of the 
Local Defense Units and UPDF are another source of weapons flows to the 
local communities. The biggest triggers without doubt however, have been 
the long conflicts in Sudan and the DRC. Recent case-studies on the flow of 
small arms in the border areas of Uganda, the DRC, and Sudan establish the 
sources of small arms as the 1989/1990 battlefields in central Equatoria, the 
successful ambush on a GoS military convoy in Livolo in the Ugandan border 
area in 1997, the desertion of garrison towns by GoS troops, and the split that 
occurred in the SPLM/A forces after Torit town fell to the Khartoum govern-
ment in September 2002. The research also establishes the important role 
played in the trade by SPLM/A deserters and the Sudanese IDPs in Uganda. 
The result is that an AK 47 goes for as little as Ush 25,000 (approximately 12 
$) in the Sudanese border town of Kajo-Keji49. Clearly, prices are going to fall 
further with the demise of the NURF II and the reintegration of its estimated 
2400 rebels in West Nile, canceling part of the market demand.
Third, the rebellion could tap into the economic and political resources 
of a large Diaspora of Acholi with a history of strained relations with the 
Museveni government. Many of these had gone into exile in the early years 
of Amin. When, for example, the UPDA signed the Pece Peace Agreement 
with the NRM/A, the UPDA faction led by Latek continued to receive sup-
port from the UPDM. Obita, the self-styled LRM Secretary for External Af-
fairs from 1996 to 98, also describes how a particular London-based Acholi 
businessman by name of Powell Onen Ojwang, persuaded the LRA High 
Command in 1997 to prioritize an increase in military capacity and offered 
48 Bradbury,  M.,  An  overview 
of initiatives for peace in Acholi, 
Northern Uganda, Reflecting on 
Peace Practice Project, The Col-
laborative  for  Development  Ac-
tion, October 1999, p.4. In 1996 
for example, 20 million US$ of 
military  equipment  was  sent  to 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  and  Uganda, 
to help overthrow the Islamic re-
gime in Sudan (Washington Post, 
10/11/1996, page A34).
49 Larjour  Consultancy,  South 
Sudan  case  study  covering  a 
number  of  counties  in  Central 
and  Western  Equatoria,  Decem-
ber 2002; CEFORD, small arms 
proliferation in the border areas 
of Uganda: a case study of West 
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to finance it50. Obviously precise data on the extent of such financial support 
are not available. To give an idea of the potential offered, the best place to 
look is the area of capital flight. The estimates of Collier et al indicate that by 
1986 some 60% of private wealth in Uganda was held abroad51. Other authors 
estimate the total capital flight in Uganda over the period 1970-1996 at a total 
3,316.1 million US $ (real terms 1996 value), including imputed interest earn-
ings, or an average annual capital flight of 3.1% of GDP52. By 1997, the Ugan-
dan government had turned the tide on capital flight, yet an estimated 50% 
of private wealth remained abroad53. Although the above data are anecdotal 
and circumstantial and do not establish a conclusive link between capital held 
abroad and the financing of rebellion, other experiences such as the case of 
Somaliland do show the potential of such links54. In any case, during the 
Consultative Group meeting between donors and the GoU in May 2003, the 
Prime Minister called upon donor countries to suppress financial support for 
the rebellion from the Ugandan Diaspora in their home countries.
 
Finally, there was the huge stock of former UNLA soldiers, important 
as a catalyst of rebellion because it formed a fertile recruitment ground for 
rebel movements and created social turmoil. There are no straightforward 
and reliable figures on troop strength of the successive Ugandan armies, and 
certainly not of the UNLA at the time of its folding55. Obviously, it is also not 
clear how many men came from the Acholi districts. Just to give an indica-
tion, from 1992 to 95 Museveni demobilized 30,000 troops from an army of 
approximately 50,00056. The number of UNLA soldiers returning to Acho-
liland can safely be assumed to be ten thousand at a minimum. There had 
been no demobilization: the soldiers simply packed their arms and fled north. 
Inherent in the nature of this lumpen militariat, education was not much in 
evidence, and so affected the opportunity cost of participating in rebellion. 
As a rule, the adjustment from military to civilian life throws up tremendous 
challenges when soldiers have low professional qualifications and limited non-
military skills. These men had less to lose by joining rebel movements than 
their peers with a higher stake in regular economic exchange. At the same 
time, the economic situation in Acholi was in a tailspin. Peasants experienced 
increasing economic hardships, caused by the isolation of the region from the 
rest of the market. It is important to recall the economic context of 1986, with 
per capita GDP 60% below its level of 1970, and with inflation at 240%. By 
1987, exports other than coffee had ceased, while the external debt service 
was more than 50% of exports57. Immediate conditions were exacerbated by 
structural adjustment measures which the IMF imposed in 1987, with a loan 
from its Structural Adjustment Facility. People claim to have lost their cash 
savings for example as a result of the currency change. As an immediate re-
sult of the privatization programme, some 350,000 government workers were 
retrenched, and with the private sector not expanding fast enough to absorb 
these numbers, unemployment increased sharply58. 
50 Obita, J.A., First international 
peace efforts 1996-98, Accord
51 Collier, P., A. Hoeffler and C. 
Pattillo, Flight capital as portfo-
lio choice, Development Research 
Working Paper 2066, World Bank, 
1999
52 Boyce,  J.K.,  Ndikumana,  L, 
Is  Africa  a  Net  Creditor?  New 
estimates  of  capital  flight  from 
severely  indebted  Sub-Saharan 
African  countries,  1970-1996, 
University  of  Massachusetts, 
p.40-41
53 Collier, op.cit.,1999
54 Leenco  Lata,  Inter-state  poli-
tics and its impact on insurgency 
and  the  flow  of  arms  into  and 
within the Horn of Africa, Inter-
national Resource Group Confer-
ence, Mombasa, Nov.6-9, 1996
55 One  aspect  was  the  opportu-
nity for corruption created by a 
large number of ‘ghost soldiers’.
56 A number of these were later 
remobilized  to  fight  the  LRA, 
ADF, to be sent to the DRC, and 
to create the 5th division in 2003.
57 IMF  Survey,  Ghana,  Senegal, 
and Uganda adopt bold reforms, 
November 1996.
58 Naiman,  R.,  Watkins,  N.,  A 
survey  of  the  impacts  of  IMF 
Structural Adjustment in Africa: 
growth, social spending and debt 
relief, Center for Economic and 
Social Policy (CEPR), April 1999
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The severity of these measures was such that they were reversed after 
local and international pressure. It is said for example that Alice Lakwena 
opposed tax tickets and currency devaluations. The combination of these 
various elements created a negative economic spiral, which locked in favo-
rable conditions for future rebellion. Ex-soldiers with low skills engaged in 
rebellion because the opportunity costs for them were lower. By so doing 
they affected economic growth and education, lowering the opportunity cost 
for future rebellion across society. With no employment opportunities, lack 
of food and physical security, weapons increasingly had an economic as well 
as security value for those who possessed them. These are principal aspects 
of the famed adagio that ‘in war the bad economy chases the good’. We noted 
already the gradual neutralization of politics. With the additional progressive 
surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security becomes the basic principle 
of state activity. 
Related to this is the status in village life of those UNLA troops who 
had returned. Behrend describes how the lack of discipline and restlessness 
of returning UNLA troops made them into ‘internal strangers’ in Acholi so-
ciety. A form of witchcraft which exists in Acholi is kiroga, associated with 
spirit possession and practiced primarily to take revenge. On demand, a spirit 
medium can instigate a cen, the vengeful spirit of a person who has died a bad 
death, to inflict on the victim insanity, infertility, disease, or death59. During 
the civil war, the UNLA soldiers had killed, tortured, and looted in Luweero. 
As they went back to Acholi they carried with them cen, the bad spirits of 
those maimed and killed, jeopardizing the lives of those who had remained in 
Acholi. Many soldiers refused to submit to purification rituals by the Acholi 
elders, an aspect of the generation struggle, which left the cen unreconciled 
and turned the soldiers into ‘internal strangers’ to be feared and shunned.
So far we have examined the root causes and advantageous circum-
stances that gathered force in a state of social turmoil without credible po-
litical leadership. The way out took the shape of a deliverance couched in 
religious discourse. In the next part we will take a closer look at how Alice 
Lakwena’s insurgence was configured. The emergence and transformation of 
the LRA can only be made comprehensible in its relation, even opposition to, 
the HSMF.
The Format of rebellion
Millenarian movements and the use of violence
Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement was the product of elements 
of missionary Christianity interacting with indigenous cosmology, a product 
which turned millenarian (referring to expectations from God of imminent 
salvation). Millenarian discourse and rebellion seem strange bedfellows, an 
oddity which seems at first glance best left to the investigative scalpel of 
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anthropologists to dissect. In actual fact, religion and violence are not such 
an odd blend. Until the nineteenth century, religion provided the only accept-
able justifications for terror.60 “Images of death have never been far from the 
heart of religion’s power to stir the imagination”61. Historic parallels demon-
strate that a millenarian discourse is an excellent framework for political and 
social rebellion against an established order, and for nationalist revival and 
the restitution of identity. We don’t have to go back to the time when Jewish 
zealots murdered their compatriots and Roman soldiers, and poisoned the 
wells of Jerusalem. The Belgian colonial powers in Congo for example, had to 
deal with a number of millenarian movements, Kitawala, Anioto, Maji-Maji 
and others, just as the Nandi uprising against the British colonial powers in 
Kenya was led by the spirit medium and diviner Koitalel Arap Samoei. Alice 
Lakwena’s uprising shared a common core of beliefs with all of these: the 
struggle against sorcery, the purification of society, the rejection of coercive 
elements of (colonial) rule such as taxes, the establishment of new hierarchies 
that countered customary and local authorities etc. Most of these movements 
articulated power by using terror to illustrate the limit of the political and 
administrative sphere. For instance, the Anioto or ‘Leopard Men’ active in 
the area around Beni in the 1920’s and 30’s, articulated power by attacking 
at all hours and invoked terror through indiscriminate victim selection. This 
demonstrated the inability of the authorities, colonial as well as customary, to 
protect their people from terror, as well as hurting their ‘wealth in people’62. 
Contemporary parallels of alternative violent ideologies of public order, 
rooted in religion, are easy to find. Suffice it to cite the examples of Islamic 
fundamentalism, the racist vision of the Aryan Nation in the US, or the Jewish 
terrorism of Gush Emunim. In Uganda as well, millenarian movements other 
than those in the North have been active, with equally devastating conse-
quences. The mass-suicide or murder of more than 300 people in Kanungu in 
South-West Uganda in March 2000 is still fresh in the mind. They were led 
by a number of ex-communicated Catholic priests, nuns, and an ex-prostitute 
who claimed to act as a medium for messages and rules sent by the Virgin 
Mary. Purportedly, one of the messages was the destruction of the World and 
the selection of the chosen few to be taken to heaven on 17 March 2000. In 
an entirely different league but illuminating all the same is the preference 
for prayer-rallies as format for mobilizing people to protest for example the 
continuing war in the North. The expression of intense religious belief con-
veyed through such rallies is an aspect beyond analysis. One cannot evade the 
question however whether their popularity as instrument for spontaneous mo-
bilization is not a feature of the de-institutionalization of politics in Uganda. 
Politics as such does not disappear but simply searches another outlet through 
an alternative discourse.
60 Rapoport, fear and trembling: 
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The Holy Spirit Mobile Forces
We already noted the type of witchcraft known as kiroga and the cen 
brought back by returning UNLA soldiers who refused to submit to purifica-
tion rituals. The two elements complemented each other in a sort of catch-22 
situation. Cen increased the fears of kiroga, and the increase in witchcraft 
increased the impurity of the moral order in Acholi. The elders, unable to 
enforce attempts to reconstitute the moral order, interpreted this breakdown 
as the cause of catastrophes: the civil war, AIDS, the loss of state power, and 
increasing distrust between the people. It now lay with a ‘prophet’ to establish 
a new discourse and dissolve the vicious circle63.
Alice Auma, who was a spirit medium in Kitgum, proclaimed that the 
spirit Lakwena ordered her in August 1986 to stop healing and raise an army 
called the ‘Holy Spirit Mobile Forces’ to wage a war against the evil overtak-
ing the land. In fighting a war against an external enemy (the NRA), Alice 
Lakwena mobilized, reintegrated and rehabilitated the internal enemies (the 
impure UNLA soldiers and sorcerers). After undergoing a range of rituals 
that united elements of Christian and traditional rites, at times even from Is-
lam, the Holy Spirit soldiers were considered pure or maleng (sanctified) and 
invulnerable in battle. If they were wounded or died on the battlefield, it was 
because they were no longer pure by violating any of 20 rigidly proscribed 
‘Holy Spirit Safety Precautions’ which would create a new humankind64. The 
mode of warfare of the HSMF was governed by the Holy Spirit Tactics, a 
mode of conducting war that disregarded all military principles, led by a 
range of spirits, chief amongst them Lakwena. It was a ‘magical war’ against 
war, using a mix of modern warfare, praying and rituals, which allowed Holy 
Spirit soldiers to adhere to the commandment not to kill, since it were the 
spirits that guided bullets to their targets. Even elements of nature such as 
stones, bees and snakes were considered allies of the HSMF65. Although in 
the end the HSMF was defeated a mere 80 km from Kampala, Alice Lakwena 
transformed Uganda’s history by laying a blueprint for the unfolding rebel-
lion of Kony. To put into perspective the emergence of the LRA, a number 
of essentials from Lakwena’s outline need to be stressed. These are the un-
derstanding of war as a healing process, the uniqueness of the HSM features 
combining  elements  of  a  military  organization  and  cult,  and  the  rapidly 
changing character and composition of the HSMF. 
The Holy Spirit Movement was an attempt to reconstitute the moral 
order based on the formulation of an alternative theory of social tensions and 
power relationships. This formulation used the idiom of religion and ritual or, 
as Behrend calls it, ‘edification by puzzlement’. Waging war was understood 
as an ordeal, but nonetheless a necessary instrument in the process of cleans-
ing or purifying to separate the just from the unjust to create a healed rather 
than suffering community. A pre-condition to be purified or ‘rendered just’ 
(maleng), was to accept guilt and undergo the rituals of cleansing. Terror was 
used for example against those UPDA rebels that refused to undergo the ritu-
63 Behrend, op.cit., p.29-30
64 Ibidem, p.45-48
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als and join the HSMF, because they obstructed the realization of a vision of 
a new society. Death or injury on the battlefield was the price one paid for not 
remaining maleng. 
Also, the blueprint Alice Lakwena laid out was unique. Was it a cult or 
a military organization? It contained elements of both, but also transcended 
these. Lakwena established the HSMF for the purpose of war to enable the 
spread of a cult, which contained important emancipatory elements. On the 
one side the HSMF was rigidly organized in 4 companies, each of which was 
sub-divided in a number of platoons, themselves consisting of 3 sections each. 
The headquarters company was divided into departments, which catered for 
intelligence, munitions and weapons store, logistics etc. The command struc-
ture consisted of an overall Commander of the Forces (CF), with Officers 
in Command (OC) of the companies, and platoon and section commanders. 
Each of these had a Second in Command (2IC)66. At the same time, the spirit 
‘Lakwena’ was the overall Chairman of the Movement, with different spirits 
known as ‘Wrong Element’, ‘Ching Po’, and ‘Franco’ chairing the various 
companies. The role of Alice Auma was to mediate in the dialogue between 
these spirits and their Movement. Other recognizable cult elements consisted 
of the use of rituals that allowed ‘God’s Might’ to be manipulated for specific 
ends, and the creation of a temple in Opit (Kitgum) as the center of a cru-
sade to morally rehabilitate the entire population of liberated territories by 
establishing ‘spirit yards’, stressing the observance of the ‘HS Safety Precau-
tions’, and persecuting sorcerers and witches. Moreover, after the destruction 
of the Amin years, the HSM acted in more ways than one as the forerunner 
of a modern emancipatory movement, with connotations of popular election, 
oversight, accountability, and affirmative action. To give some examples, the 
spirit Lakwena chose a woman to lead his movement because women were 
oppressed; the commanders at various levels of the HSMF, meeting mini-
mum educational standards, were elected by the soldiers and were ‘overseen’ 
by a spirit; the headquarters company established a separate ‘Women’s Office’ 
and ‘Children’s Office’; and a ‘War Mobilization Committee’ functioned as a 
decentralized structure with layers from district to village level to mobilize 
logistics for the war effort, issuing receipts for each donation. 
Short-lived though the HSM was, during its military campaign its com-
position and to a certain extent its character evolved. Originally an Acholi 
movement, incorporating Langi as it went, the Teso became its largest contin-
gent at one time. The HSM was able to cross ethnic boundaries in the ‘North’ 
but proved unable to maintain this feature when it crossed into the ‘South’. 
As it largely depended on its mobilizing capacity, the ‘hardness’ of ethnic 
boundaries after decades of ethnic retaliation spelled its undoing once it 
crossed into ‘Southern’ Busoga territory. Where originally it consisted main-
ly of former UPDA rebels, peasants, students, and schoolchildren joined as 
the ‘Mobile Forces’ marched south. Behrend suspects that about half of those 
lost their lives in the various battles and the violent aftermath and retribution 
against the remaining HSMF ‘soldiers’ after their defeat67. The rapidly chang-
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ing composition may also have caused a change in character over time. The 
UPA was a rebel movement active in the Teso area. The unprovoked killing 
of a number of its leaders on orders of Alice Lakwena broadened the hostile 
dynamics that already existed between the HSMF and the UPDA and Kony. 
Where originally women had successfully played a major role in all aspects of 
the war, including battle, social reality caught up with the HSM and women 
were increasingly relegated to the kitchen. Where the HSMF soldiers encoun-
tered hostility of the local population, such as in the town of Mbale on the way 
south, they resorted to violence to obtain provisions. In the end and unlike the 
LRA, its short life-span may have saved the Holy Spirit Movement from itself 
and the internal contradictions it was increasingly unable to master. 
The Lord’s Resistance Army
The previous look at the genesis and downfall of the HSM helps us to 
look at the LRA as a radical structure of rejection: the extent to which it is or 
has been a movement to reconstitute the moral order and how war figures in 
it, and how its nature and composition have changed over the years. We will 
argue first that the LRA is a more conventional guerilla army than the HSMF 
ever was, but that the religious justification for violence remains, if not domi-
nant, extremely significant. The LRA sees its struggle against the GoU as a 
divine cause that is being directed and guided by God through his prophet 
Kony, a former altar boy who joined the UPDA as a ‘spiritual mobilizer’ in 
the UPDA’s ‘black battalion’ in Gulu in early 198768. This is expressed not so 
much in the words of Kony or other LRA leaders. Kony hardly ever speaks 
publicly, and in this he resembles Velupillai Prabhakaran, the elusive leader of 
the ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, who is an enigma even to his most loyal 
commanders and has murdered many of them for suspected treason69. On 
the occasions when a direct record of Kony’s statements was possible, he did 
not elaborate on the spiritual aspect of his struggle70. In the absence of a reli-
able spokesperson for the LRA, the spiritual aspect of the struggle is mainly 
pieced together from the reports of escapees and the visible characteristics of 
LRA practices: the interpretation of the war as ordained by spirits through 
a prophet, the importance of supporting rituals, the transcendent moralism 
justifying wholesale acts of violence as against the ‘conventional’ secular 
terrorist principle of the minimum force necessary, and the ritual intensity 
with which these acts are committed. We then look at possible meanings of 
the wholesale use of terror. The final part of our argument contends that very 
quickly, as the character and composition of the movement evolved to include 
the wholesale use of terror and kidnapping of children, the LRA became in-
creasingly ensnared in a series of internal contradictions that it has proven un-
able to master. The result is that through its actions, the LRA has exacerbated 
the process of dehumanization it set out to counter.
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Spiritual warfare
In the early years, Kony’s troops seemed to have used a version of ‘Holy 
Spirit’ tactics identical to that of Lakwena. This aspect was, however, much 
less clearly articulated and in the public eye than the vision of Lakwena, and 
therefore more ambiguous from the start. All the same, a drastic change oc-
curred with the signing of the peace accord between the UPDA and the NRA. 
The defiant UPDA commander Odong Latek joined Kony in 1988 rather than 
opting for peace. They declared their intention to continue fighting in a joint 
letter, which marked them out as having a much more Acholi nationalist vi-
sion than did Alice Lakwena, whose vision was that of radically transforming 
society, starting with Acholi and moving beyond. This UPDA connection is 
important in appreciating the nature of the LRA. It establishes an unbroken 
link with those non-purified former UNLA soldiers, the so-called ‘internal 
strangers’ in the idiom of Alice Lakwena. Remember that the HSMF and 
the section of the UPDA that refused to join her and stood in the way of her 
vision, were bitter enemies. These soldiers, tainted by their former UNLA 
connections, had refused to be ‘spiritually rehabilitated’. Now they refused 
to be formally integrated under a peace agreement with the NRM/A. In other 
words, it was the very hard core of the UNLA lumpen militariat that teamed 
up with Kony to consolidate what would become the LRA. Several authors 
point out that the peace accord between the NRM/A and the UPDA brought 
the bulk of the UPDA back into the fold, but that those with the least educa-
tion and the least to lose remained in the bush, confirming the suspicion that 
the previously discussed element of opportunity costs, ‘having nothing else 
to do’, was a real factor in consolidating this alliance. According to Charles 
Alai, a founder member of the UPDA (and in 1996 Minister of State for Pub-
lic Services): “when we (UPDA) came out, we had already disagreed with 
Kony and he took the most deadly and primitive officers with him”71. To this 
day, the commanders closest to Kony such as Tabuley and Vincent Otti, are 
part of this UNLA/UPDA legacy in the LRA. This is significant for two rea-
sons: they convinced Kony of favoring tested guerilla tactics over Holy Spirit 
tactics, and they brought with them an accomplished military experience of 
using terror as an instrument of war. Currently, the LRA is definitely struc-
tured along a military format with a strict hierarchy, albeit one that reflects its 
preference for guerilla tactics rather than the use of large formations favored, 
to its detriment, by the HSMF. Like a regular infantry army, the LRA has 5 
brigades named Stocree, Sinia, Gilva, Shila, and Control Altar72.
Even so, it would be a mistake to dismiss out of hand the force of the 
rebel’s beliefs. A number of elements seem unambiguous from countless 
debriefing reports given by children who escaped from the LRA. First, like 
Alice Lakwena and the HSMF, Kony does not function in his own capacity, 
but as ‘loar’ or messenger of the spirits73. Operational orders from the spirits 
are passed by Kony to his military commanders. Kony introduced new and 
totally different spirits from those that guided Alice Lakwena, the novelty 
corresponding to his claims of supremacy. Their character and duties how-
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ever are recognizable. They include a female Chief of Operations called Silli 
Silindi, a Korean Deputy Chief Ing Chu, who makes sure that hostile bullets 
only hit the sinful LRA soldiers and who commands an imaginary jeep bat-
talion, two Americans named King Bruce and Jim Brickey, and the spirit of 
Juma Oris, the deceased interior minister under Idi Amin74. Whether these 
elements are fact or fancy is irrelevant here. What matters is that people be-
lieve it to be true. There have been documented cases where abductees were 
reluctant to take advantage of first rate opportunities for escape, a factor that 
some attribute to the fear of Kony’s spiritual powers and to which they ascribe 
the limited success of the Amnesty Law so far75. 
Second, the famous ‘ten commandments’ are reminiscent of Alice’s 
Holy Spirit Safety Precautions, and her vision of maintaining the ‘purity’ of 
society through strict adherence to them. It is important to see that in essence 
Kony’s vision is not orthodox Christian, as is often argued on the basis of his 
alleged intention to rule society based on the ‘biblical Ten Commandments’, 
but that it is a system that is unorthodox, in conflict with the body of essential 
teachings regarding beliefs and practices to which the LRA compares itself. 
Although the edicts are identified with Moses’ Ten Commandments, they are 
more an adapted allusion to a traditional practice of the Acholi elders to draw 
up a catalogue of prohibitions in times of crisis, the observation of which was 
supposed to cure a disturbed moral order76. In addition to these formal edicts 
laid down by the ‘laor’ claiming divine instruction, there are the ad hoc rules 
proclaimed by the various spirits, such as orders not to cook with oil from the 
yaa tree, sudden orders to refrain from sex, orders to let the rainwater run over 
one’s face for four minutes...77 As with the HSM, when a copy of the Koran 
was purchased when traversing Muslim areas in Iteso, allowance is made for 
some flexibility in the rules to incorporate new developments. Having a holy 
day on Friday and not breeding pigs or eating pork is an obvious nod towards 
the religion of Kony’s main backers, while the prohibition for Acholi of living 
near roads or in camps serves tactical purposes of the LRA. 
Like the HSM, elaborate rituals that include spirit yards and shea butter 
oil perform an essential function in the outlook of the LRM/A, reflecting an 
awareness that ‘it is rituals that create beliefs and not the other way round’78. 
In addition to intricate induction rituals, escaped abductees relate that they 
are not to take cover and must stand up while walking into fire, exactly like 
the Holy Spirit soldiers, in the belief that ‘holy water’ will protect them as 
long as they respect the spiritual, hence divinely ordained, commands. From 
this viewpoint, caring for the wounded is tantamount to complicity in not 
respecting the command. In a speech Kony reportedly made in base-camp in 
Sudan, he threatened to destroy Lacor hospital near Gulu, because wounded 
people “were cared for there, instead of dying”79. Other examples reminis-
cent of the Holy Spirit tactics are rife: “You also have water, they call it ‘clean 
water’, and they pour it into a bottle. If you go to the front, you have a small 
stick, and you dip it into the bottle and fling the water out. This is a river and 
drowns the bullet that might come to you”80. However, the ritualized extreme 
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violence children are forced to mete out on others very soon after abduction, 
is very different from any practices the HSMF was associated with. There are 
many crushing testimonies of children narrating how they were forced to kill 
some of their peers by means of axes, knives, or sticks81. Meant as a tool to 
break down resistance to LRA authority, to destroy taboos about killing and 
to implicate the child in criminal acts, it crowns the annals of LRA-inflicted 
trauma of the Acholi community. 
The use of terror
Religious terrorism, as opposed to ‘secular’ terrorism motivated by 
political gains, assumes a transcendental dimension. They are not fighting 
within the rules of society as they exist, but reject these rules82. Religious 
terrorists regard violence not only as a necessary expedient for the attain-
ment of their goals, which can be religious, racial or ethnic purification, but 
as divinely decreed and hence morally justified almost as a sacramental act83. 
To use a colloquial turn of phrase, violence is not only a struggle to ‘win the 
hearts and minds’ of the people, but also their souls. This may explain the 
enormous disparity between ends and means, between the number of people 
killed and maimed and the purported transformative goal behind Kony’s vi-
sion, since violence tends to be viewed as an end in itself while the desired 
political change remains nonspecific, to put it mildly.
Although drawing parallels with other experiences of religious or mil-
lenarian terrorism helps us to grasp the intensity of the violence in Acholi, 
the violence itself must be contextualized. One of the main characteristics of 
the war is that it is about the control of population, rather than territory: the 
government forces people to move, the LRA tries to abduct them. Control of 
civilians is a key strategic objective for both the UPDF and the LRA84. Cen-
tral to the conflict therefore is the issue of how sovereignty (power) works 
and how a political space is constructed and delimited, and this struggle for 
legitimacy involves the population as the object of the struggle. The sovereign 
is the one who decides over the state of exception, the distinction between 
‘law’ and ‘unlaw’, the areas where the rule of law is applicable or not: “we 
do not begin with the sovereign who decides on the state of exception; on the 
contrary, the one who can declare a state of exception is sovereign”85. In this 
sense, sovereignty is demonstrated through an act of abandoning subjects 
outside the rule of law, where humans can be killed without the commission 
of homicide, without the executioner facing any legal sanctions.
To understand this better we need to make a small detour via the Princi-
pal-Agent dilemma as espoused in economic and political theory. One of the 
features of a modern complex society is that people (principals) have to trust 
others (agents) to carry out their wishes. Examples are political representa-
tion of the people (principals) by elected members (agents), or the directors 
of a company who are themselves agents of the shareholders (principals). 
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The dilemma resides in the fact that principals cannot ensure that their best 
interests are served by their agents, because of asymmetric information be-
tween the two sides. The greater the divergence between preferences of the 
agents and principals, the greater is the so-called ‘agency loss’. The solution 
requires some way for the principals of monitoring the performance of their 
agents, and/or incentives for the agents to behave in the principals’ interests. 
In a modern democratic state, the elected government consists of politicians 
that act as agents of their constituents, but the government as a whole is sup-
posed to take to heart the interests of all citizens as enshrined in a state’s 
constitution, and can therefore be considered to function as the agent of  all 
citizens. Likewise, a terrorist movement motivated by political gains caters 
to the expectations of a particular constituency variously composed of actual 
and potential sympathizers (which can be defined in many ways, be it by way 
of ideology, nationalism etc.).
The dilemma for the population of Acholi now is twofold; the LRA is 
definitely not their agent, because the minimum expectation a principal would 
have towards the actions of an agent is that it respects their preference to stay 
alive. In the same vein, the government of Uganda does not act as the agent 
of the Acholi. In the Ugandan case under the ‘big tent’ Movement idea of 
government, all citizens are considered members of the so-called Movement, 
which is the political principal. The Acholi themselves, through their voting 
preferences massively rejected the Movement both in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections of 1996 and 2001. In what follows we shall argue that 
the Principal-Agent relation of the Acholi people both with the Movement and 
the LRA is reversed. The Acholi are not so much the principal as the agent in 
its relation with the government and the LRA. The Movement as principal ex-
pects the Acholi as agents to be aligned with the Movement’s expressed pref-
erences, and must ensure that divergences are minimized through monitoring, 
made easier by grouping the population in camps, and positive and negative 
incentives. The “agency loss’ of Acholi would be disastrous in a fragmented 
country with many centrifugal tendencies. The LRA, intent on creating its 
self-proclaimed ‘New Order’, is the principal that must ensure that the Acholi 
population caters to its preferences through monitoring and negative incen-
tives, of which terror is a mainstay. Failure of the LRA to contain ‘agency loss’ 
would spell the end of their envisaged new society. ‘Between two fires’ indeed, 
as the title of a study on the human rights situation in ‘protected camps’ aptly 
suggests86. As the villagers experience every day, falling victim to one group 
does not necessarily shield one from attack from their enemies.
Government controls the Acholi and not the other way round. Although 
the GoU has never declared a ‘state of emergency’ or ‘exception’, save for 
the period when ‘Operation North’ was conducted in 1991 and large areas of 
the North were cordoned off, the Acholi districts are effectively in a state of 
exception as marked by the forced movement of the population in so-called 
‘protected camps’87. In September 1996, the UPDF announced that everyone 
should relocate to the trading centres where the Army detachments were 
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located. This was not long after the presidential elections of 1996, in which 
the Acholi threw their weight ‘en masse’ behind the opposition candidates.   
Although humanitarian concerns were given as rationale for this develop-
ment, basic amenities were not in place. Senior UPDF Commanders talked 
about the destruction of the “intelligence of insurgency” and the removal of 
soft targets and logistics for the survival of the rebels88. In this sense, the 
state of exception, disorder, was granted a permanent and visible localization, 
where the authority monitors individuals immobilized on the edge of society 
so to speak. These camps signal that the state of exception has become the 
rule, as well as signaling the potentiality of abandonment, of being placed 
outside the rule of law as distinct from the mainstream of Ugandan society. 
This is not imaginary, as a look through reports documenting human rights 
violations against displaced persons by Ugandan government forces confirms. 
These abuses range from arbitrary arrests, torture, killings, sexual offences 
etc89. The basic strategy involved is to exploit people’s distrust for the sake of 
making them compliant with the state’s rules. To economize on information 
costs, the government relies on a self-reinforcing mechanism, namely control 
of deviant behaviour by the people themselves. The protected camps are pro-
tected by homeguard units, recruited at the grassroot level and trained for 3 
months, and commanded by officers from the regular army force. A massive 
recent recruitment drive by the army brought in 7000 new homeguards90. As 
Platteau asserts, such a strategy comes down to “vesting prosecutorial pow-
ers in the public....the distrust hereby created unavoidably gives rise to severe 
excesses or injustices and spills over into all spheres of human interaction”91. 
As the grouping of people in rural areas is never watertight, the government 
forces have had to invest in pre-emptive risk-management through continu-
ous, mobile forms of surveillance, the so-called Mobile Unit which traverses 
the countryside.
What the LRA, under the absolute control of Kony, has in common 
with the HSMF, is that it sees itself as the righteous few, those that are at once 
the activists and constituents of their movement. They are outsiders from 
what they see as a virtual world, and terror is a traumatic intervention of the 
“real” into the “virtual” world. For the LRA as for the HSMF, the popula-
tion of Acholi is a potential constituency for their vision of a renewed and 
purified society, but the potential can only be realized by passing through 
the suitable rituals and continuing to adhere to the commandments. Even 
having undergone the induction rites, one is therefore always at risk of being 
unmasked, through a violent death on the battlefield or other, as not really 
belonging to the constituency of renewal. Continued violence is for that rea-
son a fundamental condition for renewal and cleansing. Terror is also very 
much the mainstay of control of the potential constituency. The LRA needs 
the population of Acholi to act as its agents, and not to betray them actively 
or even passively, by enjoying too much the good life under Museveni. People 
are frequently warned not to go and live in the IDP camps or join the home-
guards. Being suspected of acting as informer for government forces carries 
the death penalty. In January 1997 for example, the LRA attacked a number 
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of villages in Kitgum, killing 400 people and destroying their granaries. Until 
that time, unlike Gulu District, Kitgum had been largely spared and some de-
velopment activities were proceeding well as in the neighbouring districts of 
Lango and Apac. According to the accounts of some former abductees, “the 
LRA is avenging the population of Kitgum for its alleged cooperation with 
the UPDF”92. Another example is the vicious campaign the LRA conducted 
against suspected members of government-sponsored local militia, the Ar-
row Brigades, in the early nineties in the aftermath of ‘Operation North’. The 
rebels, enraged about the ‘treason’, cut of the ears and lips, padlocked mouths 
and gouged out the eyes of suspected collaborators, mutilating them to point 
them out as turncoats. As Kony stated, “the Bible says that if your hand, eye, 
or mouth is at fault, it should be cut off”93. 
More than retaliation, terror is a vehicle to project power towards the 
Ugandan state by creating a state of exception and immobilizing the popula-
tion on the edge of society effectively enough to enforce a distinction between 
‘law’ and ‘unlaw’, where rules other than those set by the LRA do not hold. 
Unlike the UPDF which is able to immobilize the population through spatial 
confinement, the LRA must immobilize the population through fear. To be 
effective, indiscriminate terror must be more than a threat, something which, 
tragically enough, is confirmed in the daily litany of atrocities reaching the 
newsrooms. At the same time terror generalizes responsibility through the 
logic of the hostage or abductee: “the hostage is a truly sacral fetish object, a 
naked, formless body which is absolutely convertible”94. Since anybody can 
be hit, anybody can be blackmailed by terrorism. What is noteworthy here is 
that both UPDF and the LRA rely for their monitoring of the population on 
self-enforcing mechanisms that exploit people’s distrust for the sake of mak-
ing them compliant with the proscribed rules, resulting in an a-social network 
where the social space where sympathetic interaction occurs is utterly de-
stroyed. The UPDF relies on the recruitment of local homeguards, frequently 
very young. The LRA relies on the abduction of children to create a negative 
a-social network of support “by using the children as pawns to prevent their 
parents and other relatives from supporting the government”95. The LRA 
stole a child from almost every extended family in Acholi, so now “your own 
child is living as a rebel. So if the rebels come through and demand food or 
information, it is not only your fear for yourself, you think also of your child, 
and hope that your own child is not hungry”96. In this sense it is interesting 
to find Kony expressing himself about the ‘trickery of UNICEF taking our 
children away’, in reference to the efforts to reintegrate escapees97.
Internal contradictions
The type of warfare conducted by the LRA produces its own internal 
contradictions, separating the rebellion ever more from its initial intent to 
produce a purified society. Originally waged to set society free from evil, it 
uses the idioms of witchcraft (rituals, spirit possessions) to produce a situation 
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where killing and suffering are not cleansed. To the contrary, the situation is 
now understood by many in Acholi to be similar to 1986, when the unrecon-
ciled cen (bad spirits) of all those wasted lives jeopardized the existence of 
every person in Acholi. “The power of a jok (spirit) used for personal gain in 
private and for destruction constitutes witchcraft”98. Kony uses his spirits for 
vengeance and killing, and so turns into the thing he is fighting, an ajwaka, 
the most feared of witch doctors. These contradictions are sucked into a 
negative spiral powered by the built-in propensity for incremental violence. 
The public and media have become inured or de-sensitized to the unending 
stream of terrorist violence, and therefore ever higher levels of lethality are 
needed. An absolute zenith was reached by the mass killings in Pader in Oc-
tober 2002, where victims of at least one massacre were reportedly chopped 
up and cooked by the rebels, who then tried to force the villagers to eat the 
remains. In this sense, terror is indeed, and ever more so, “an event without 
consequences”99. The lethality is itself built on a recipe that blends children, 
stolen from their families, and a surplus of light and very deadly weapons 
sucked in from the wider regional conflicts. The use of children as pawns to 
create an a-social network of support, combined with the exploitation of dis-
trust, the so-called network of ‘collaborators’, as a mechanism of self-moni-
toring imposed by the LRA, in turn perpetuates the social breakdown. The 
LRA uses young girls as objects in a reward system for their commanders, 
while the UPDF encourages the practice for girls and young women to turn 
into ‘camp followers’, in the absence of anything better for them to do in a 
broken-down society. In the long run, the distrust created by these episodes 
gives rise to severe excesses, and fear and suspicion infiltrate into all spheres 
of human interaction.
Why does the war continue?
As with the other aspects of the conflict, there are no hard and fast an-
swers to the above question, indicating that the reasons for its continuation are 
many and deep. Basically there are three possible groups of answers, and all 
of these have a sediment of truth in them. Either the LRA is strong, because 
it is supported by the local population and/or supported from the outside. Or 
the UPDF is weak because of internal failings and/or competing demands put 
before it. Or we are all missing the big picture, and the war in the north is a 
façade for other goings-on, such as supporting the SPLA at the political level 
and/or doing well out of war at the level of individual officers/commanders, 
just as it provides opportunities for political posturing for politicians in a 
‘peace-seeking’ role. 
In what follows, we shall take a look at the support structure for the 
LRA, the problems the UPDF faces in fighting the war, as well as hidden 
motives. The issue of collaboration of the local population is perhaps the 
most contentious and ambiguous element of the war. Both parties use it in 
their fight for control of the population: accusations are lightly made with 
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extremely harsh retribution for those accused. With regards to international 
support, the involvement of Sudan in the war had achieved the status of ‘con-
ventional wisdom’. In the course of 2002 some new dynamics surfaced that 
may point to a wider regional setting than was hitherto understood, demon-
strating that the conflict signals as much the broader political dynamics at the 
regional level as it reflects internal Acholi dynamics. As to UPDF weakness, 
the fault seems to be a combination of tactical issues, particular to the war in 
the North, with a number of structural weaknesses. The UPDF defensive tac-
tics in Acholi are built around the localization of defense, the homeguards and 
protected camps, connected by mobile UPDF patrol units. The drawbacks of 
such a set-up are coupled with more structural issues within the UPDF as 
unearthed by the Porter Commission of Inquiry. Finally, there is evidence of 
both UPDF and LRA conduct that underscores the reality of vested economic 
interests in a  continuation of the conflict, although the issues of control over 
the extraction of (mineral) wealth or the manipulation of relief aid are not as 
clear as in other civil wars.
LRA support
Support to the LRA can be understood at the level of the Acholi popu-
lation, whether local or exiled, as well as support embedded in wider political 
machinations. With regards to the local population, the record is extremely 
ambiguous. There are reports that “some villagers, especially in Kitgum and 
Pader, do follow the bandits into their hideouts and donate goats and fowl. 
Some even chat up the commanders and share meals”100. The government 
adds its piece by regularly arresting ‘collaborators’ and even releasing lists of 
alleged financiers and collaborators, as it did in August 2002 with a list pub-
lished in the monthly army magazine ‘Tarehe Sita’101. Such allegations tend 
to clash with reports of the deliberate targeting of civilians by the LRA for 
perceived lack of support, such as the massacre of 490 civilians in Lamwo in 
January 1998. In discussions with people in the North, in particular govern-
ment representatives are wont to claim that there is an active level of support 
or ‘collaboration’ - a loaded word if ever there was one - for the LRA, differ-
ent from local support emanating from being tied into the depicted a-social 
network, or support grounded in fear. To take hold of the principal-agent lin-
go again, what they are actually saying is that the LRA is acting as the agent 
of at least part of the Acholi constituency, its principal, rather than the other 
way around. This is actually overstating the case. It may indeed be correct to 
say that the Acholi don’t trust the UPDF. A glance at the fieldwork findings 
of an exercise involving 150 people from 11 different communities, may give 
enough indications why, judging from the number and nature of abuses from 
the NRA (later UPDF) experienced at a personal level, next to the not less in-
numerable abuses endured from the UPDA, HSMF, and LRA102. The fact also 
remains that most officers of the UPDF in the North are from the southern 
part, whereas the local population is connected through kinship ties to LRA 
rebels, whether these are established through abductions or otherwise103. Yet 
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the link from this distrust of the government and UPDF to substantial opera-
tional collaboration of the Acholi with the LRA is not proven. On the whole it 
would be just as correct to say that most people are opposed to the war, and in 
this sense opposed to both sides in the conflict. Besides, government reports 
of collaborators should also be treated with a grain of salt. There is the deten-
tion without charge or trial and torture of suspected rebel collaborators in 
rural detachments. When charged, suspected members of armed opposition 
movements and so-called ‘rebel collaborators’ are often charged with treason. 
This precludes granting of bail for 360 days, so that suspected opponents of 
government can be held for long periods without trial. Hence not every person 
charged with treason is inevitably a collaborator.
In  terms  of  outside  support,  the  LRA  have  traditionally  been  one 
among several militia groups, such as the Equatoria Defense Forces (EDF) 
and the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), used by the Sudanese army 
to fight the SPLM/A. Through the Nairobi agreement of 1999, Uganda and 
Sudan have committed to the cessation of support for hostile forces on each 
other’s territory. A protocol between the two states supports ‘Operation Iron 
Fist’ by allowing the UPDF to operate south of an agreed ‘red line’ in its pur-
suit of the LRA in Sudan. Distrust between parties however remains formida-
ble. The capture of Torit by the SPLA in September 2002 must have raised a 
few eyebrows in Khartoum, regarding the keenness of the UPDF to dissuade 
the SPLA from such attacks. Remember that this offensive was waged during 
the GoS-SPLA peace talks in Machakos (Kenya), with the UPDF operating 
a little south of Torit on a special Sudan government authorization. In late 
September, Sudanese government forces bombed the UPDF in Palotaka, to 
the south of Torit, an incident later claimed to be an ‘accident’ by the GoS. 
Vice versa, suspicions that the GoS, directly or through its proxy militia, has 
tacitly continued to support the LRA, or has once more started doing so after 
renewed SPLA activity, are openly aired in the Ugandan press and just as vig-
orously denied by the GoS. In an interview with CNN, Museveni “accused 
Sudan of secretly arming the LRA and fuelling the insurgency in northern 
Uganda in a bid to expand her borders”104. Whether these accusations are 
surefire is hard to verify, although there are persistent messages about the 
good quality of weaponry and uniforms of the LRA.
The Sudanese connection is however only one element in a complex set 
of regional and international relationships. The fact that the LRA is without 
a recognizable political wing, has spurred on various groups to try and com-
mandeer the military strength of the LRA for their political agenda. In this 
one should consider that the LRA is presently the only operational rebel group 
in Uganda, after the defeat of the ADF and the peace agreement between the 
GoU and the NURF II. Formerly, there was talk about connections between 
the ADF and the LRA, both allegedly supported by Sudan. More recently, 
there have been rumors of a link between former presidential candidate Col. 
Kizza Besigye’s Reform Agenda and the LRA. One of Besigye’s former aides, 
James Opoka, supposedly made contacts with the LRA, and the government 
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press declared he may have been executed in March 2003 together with ten 
other LRA rebels. “Sources said those executed rebels were trying to link 
up with some Reform Agenda members to groom a political leader without 
Kony’s knowledge. Sources said Kony was outraged by the move and ordered 
the immediate execution of the 10 rebels”105. Government has consistently as-
serted a link between the Reform Agenda and a new and obscure rebel group 
called the ‘People’s Redemption Army’ (PRA) allegedly backed by Rwanda 
through its proxies in Eastern Congo (RCD Goma). The least the disclosures 
about a suspected link between the Reform Agenda and the LRA makes clear 
then, is the possible embedding of the continuation or resolution of the war in 
Acholi in wider regional relations than was so far believed.
 
Internal problems of the UPDF
The internal problems of the UPDF are no secret. As one article puts it, 
“troop registers were greatly inflated and soldiers unprepared. Commanders 
were corrupt, salaries were late and low, and there was little incentive to 
anyone to fight... Buses leaving Gulu are routinely stopped and searched in 
an attempt to catch the many army deserters”106. For most of the duration of 
‘Operation Iron Fist’, ongoing since March 2002, President Museveni has been 
encamped in Gulu to oversee the operations himself. With the LRA in June 
2003 entering far-off districts such as Katakwi and Adjumani for the first 
time since 1991, President Museveni felt compelled to give a personal account 
of events in the press. One of the concerns he tackles in the statement is that of 
indiscipline and laxity in the army, citing drunkenness as one of the contrib-
uting factors107. Similarly, according to the Monitor newspaper, the LRA gave 
advance notice to the UPDF of an impending attack in Mucwini (Kitgum), 
where 70 civilians were massacred in July 2002 after the UPDF apparently 
disregarded the message, while the New Vision reported the rounding up by 
the garrison commander of 68 soldiers in Gulu town for bad behaviour in 
the same month108. Although the state of affairs cannot be compared to the 
excesses of Amin’s army, it is clear that these issues do not inspire confidence 
in UPDF alertness and discipline. 
This is to a certain extent related to the way counter-insurgency is 
structured around uneducated and poorly trained homeguards in rural army 
outposts where the army officers-on-duty are often absent. As the Porter 
report establishes with regards to the conduct of the overall Commander, 
Kazini, in the DRC, “in the matter of control of his commanders in the field, 
investigation, follow-up and disciplinary action in relation to complaints 
under this officer’s area of command were suspiciously weak”. The swift 
and non-transparent verdicts delivered by the mobile court-martials in those 
rare cases where abuses and episodes of indiscipline committed by army 
grunts are tried, and the immediate carrying out of executions, do not allevi-
ate doubts about the army’s effectiveness. There is still no law that regulates 
minimum requirements and promotion within the army. A frequent complaint 
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from the President as overall Commander of the UPDF is donor pressure to 
curtail military expenditures, leaving it with no or obsolete crucial equip-
ment such as attack and troop transport helicopters. To the extent that this is 
correct, there are questions again about tactics. As Major General Tinyefuza 
cautioned Parliament in 1997, “when you start shooting tanks at rebels, then 
you know you are in trouble”. In terms of the pressures on the army and the 
implied effects on its performance, these have been well-documented. The 
army presence in the DRC for example, only recently withdrawn, and addi-
tional conflict dynamics related to Karamajong cattle rustling and small arms 
trade, have strained the capacity to respond effectively to changes in conflict 
dynamics. The UPDF’s ability does not seem to have been beefed up by the 
creation of the 5th Division, nor through across the board cutbacks of 23% on 
all government programmes in favour of an increase in defense expenditures 
in the fiscal year 2002-2003, or the highly publicized US contribution of 3 
million $ to ‘fight terrorism in the North’109. 
Doing well out of war
An added factor keeping alive the conflict is that the war over time 
has “become a lucrative source and cover for clandestine income for high-
ranking  military  and  government  officials  and  other  profiteers”110.  Have 
the government and the LRA, or factions within them, developed a vested 
interest to keep the war going? Ostensibly, the economic motivations behind 
the persistence of the war are not as apparent as they are for example in the 
eastern DRC, with its prize of gold, timber, and coltan, or the case of Sierra 
Leone’s or Angola’s ‘blood diamonds’. Still in a town like Kitgum, cut off 
by the threat of rebel ambushes and with a high rate of infant malnutrition, 
casual observation of the shops and bars finds them well-stocked with most 
amenities such as hardware, food and drugs, while beer is certainly not an 
article lacking in supplies. Curiously, unlike the WFP convoys, the distribu-
tion of a bulky item such as beer seems not to attract the notice of the LRA. 
Similarly, new buildings are going up in Kitgum as well as Gulu. The LRA 
has routinely looted food and valuables from the rural population when it is 
on the move. At the start of ‘Operation Iron Fist’ for example, the LRA fled 
from Juba to the safety of the Imatong Hills just across from the Ugandan 
border. There it ransacked and razed to the ground at least 6 villages, killing 
more than 470 villagers, and attacked a number of IDP camps. In Uganda, it 
habitually extracts surpluses from the rural population, either by looting any 
food stocks and valuables, which are then portered by adult abductees, or by 
forcing adults sleeping in the bush to ‘pay the lodge’, a fee of Ush 10,000 (US$ 
5) at the peril of being abducted. 
President Museveni has consistently maintained in public that the war 
in Acholi was about personal enrichment of the rebel leaders, ‘parasites of 
society’, fighting for a style of life they could not afford through ‘legal toil’111. 
Yet suspicions of vested interests are not related to one side of the conflict 
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uniquely. As in other situations, some people within the army would profit di-
rectly or indirectly from the conflict. We have already flagged the theft of all 
cattle from Acholi in the period 1987-88, at an estimated value of 24 million 
US$, in which the NRA was at least passively involved by not preventing it. 
Other classic examples are the ‘mundane’ forms of corruption, such as pad-
ding the records with a number of ghost soldiers, more than 10,000 according 
to an army audit in 1997, or the army fuel to which a green colorant had to 
be added to prevent its sale to civilians112. In 1997, the president criticized the 
monthly disappearance of 400 million Ush of funds destined to finance the 
government’s war effort in the North113. And if the experiences of the army’s 
conduct in the DRC are anything to go by, the report of the Porter Commis-
sion on ill-gotten wealth in the DRC may yield some noteworthy clues. It finds 
no conclusive evidence of a number of allegations made in the UN report114, 
but with regards to a particular form of racketeering states categorically that 
“there is no doubt that as a matter of practice ‘Security/Intelligence Funding’ 
was imposed on RCD, businessmen and companies, or that General Kazini’s 
regret was that his commanders were likely to take the money for themselves, 
rather than accounting to him”115. Yet the biggest trophy for unscrupulous 
army officers in keeping the war going may have less to do with the nature of 
some of the above manipulations, and more with the war providing a ration-
ale for increased defense expenditures which can then be subjected to dodgy 
procurement practices, as the saga of the junk helicopters suggests. Inciden-
tally, classified expenditures under the defense budget are not subject to any 
civilian control procedures, including the scrutiny of the Attorney General. 
To avoid vested interests from becoming too entrenched, both Museveni and 
Kony rotate the contingents of commanders and combatants. The regular ro-
tation of top posts in the UPDF is well-known. It is said that the same applies 
to the LRA, with brigades being shifted around the north. Some even link 
the flare-ups in LRA violence in particular places to the effecting of these 
transfers on the ground.
A concern for the donor community is whether their support will not in 
itself grow to be a prize in the conflict. So far, the manipulation and taxing of 
aid has not been an apparent strategy of the parties to the conflict, although 
at one time rumours circulated that it did play a role in financing the local 
election campaigns of early 2002. Up to now, the LRA has burned rather than 
looted relief aid coming in, as was the case with a truck filled with non-food 
items ambushed on the Gulu-Kitgum road or the ambush of a WFP convoy 
carrying 300 tons of food aid in September 2002. Targeting food aid may 
well become a strategy with the current huge displacement of the population, 
combined with the LRA’s loss of its rear base in Sudan, forcing it to be on the 
move in an environment where all food has long gone. On a different note but 
related, is the question for donors whether the monetization of the Amnesty 
process through the provision to returnees of packages of non food items and 
cash, will not undermine the very process of reconciliation and reintegration 
the amnesty is supposed to promote. It is reported for example that in 1994, 
when for a moment it seemed as if Betty Bigombe might bring home ‘the head 
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of the elephant’ (peace), some youngsters joined the LRA so as to benefit 
from whatever amnesty package might be provided for ex-combatants in a 
formal peace settlement. 
Is no loaf better than half a loaf?116
No words can do justice to the obscenity of the war in northern Uganda. 
The LRA is in total breach of the human rights standards that the world com-
munity has defined in international law. The use of the community’s own 
children and the lack of an explicit agenda for the violence epitomize the ulti-
mate depoliticization, even depriving the victim of the possibility of ascribing 
responsibility for, or understanding of, the anguish suffered. At the same time, 
the conflict offers us a strident vision of the state in extreme circumstances.
The robustness of the conflict as a semi-permanent feature of the Ugan-
dan condition for the last 17 years indicates that the forces working against 
peace appear to be stronger than the forces working for it. This seems to give 
emphasis to contextualizing the conflict within a broader strategy of violence 
legitimization; “At a time when the state’s very statehood is being challenged, 
the attack, even as it undermines the sovereign’s hold, provides it with a 
unique opportunity to performatively reassert its centrality along the lines of 
the protego ergo obligo”1 17.
In this light the way forward is unambiguous, and has been repeated ad 
infinitum. The best anti-terrorism strategy is an expansive approach of demo-
cratic, social and political change by non-violent means, complemented by an 
equally expansive approach to augment the opportunity cost of rebellion by 
increasing the endowment of economic and human capital.
An important and commendable aspect over the years have been the ef-
forts to create a common space through dialogue, in order to reduce the levels 
of violence sufficiently so that normal means of social and political conflict 
resolution can come into play. In these attempts to create an environment 
in which the LRA rebels can lay down their arms, through strengthening of 
social institutions and mechanisms for conflict resolution, civil society insti-
tutions have been a testimony to the ability and willingness of local people 
to contribute to peace. Their efforts serve as an emergent model of collabora-
tive problem solving at the local level, especially as some of these initiatives 
constitute an important departure from the legacy of religious polarization 
and partisanship, as demonstrated by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace 
Initiative. Single-handedly, these organizations have made the case of the 
abducted children in Uganda a ‘cause célèbre’ in the child rights movement 
and the campaigns against child soldiers. On the other hand, many of the 
strategies are still new and untested, and at times there seem to be no clear 
distinctions between the objectives of humanitarian, development, human 
rights, and conflict resolution agencies, so that potential contradictions are 
not always recognized. In addition, and as Bradbury put it, “the simplicity of 
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much analysis neglects the wider forces at play”118. This is especially the case 
where it concerns the LRA on the one hand, how it is constituted, its relation 
with the local population, and the mix of military and political strategies of 
government on the other. There seems to be a pronounced degree of unaware-
ness for example of the balance of forces and the abuses meted out on the 
other side of the border, involving Sudanese Acholi as perpetrators in one of 
the various militia such as the EDF, or as victims, for example the hundreds 
of people that perished in the massive LRA attacks near the Imatong Hills in 
September 2002. However important the efforts of civil society are in psy-
cho-social counseling and community-based reconciliation, there is a need to 
look beyond the problems of Acholi social institutions and the psychological 
behaviour of the Acholi, and recognize the politics of the situation at national 
and regional level.
In attempting to create local institutional mechanism for dialogue to 
overcome resistance of the conflict to negotiated settlement, a number of di-
lemmas stand out. First is the difficulty of advocating for a peace settlement to 
which the key may lie with parties beyond the reach of local actors; the LRA 
ability to act independently from the GoS for example is unclear. Second 
is the difficulty to develop a common language to bridge the very different 
worldviews of the parties to the conflict. How to develop an agenda for nego-
tiation and settlement with a rebel group that stresses a spiritual/millenarian 
dimension of ‘cleansing’ and ‘liberation’ and that keeps on hammering the 
point of historical wrongs?119 One of the main attempts to overcome this 
dilemma, and develop a system of interlocutors between the rebels, govern-
ment and the local population, has been the resurrection of the traditional 
leaders, in essence the re-creation of the system of clan leaders (rwodi) and 
the anointment of a new set of rwodi. There are definitely questions about the 
effectiveness of the reinvention of traditional leadership structures of male 
elders in a context of war and profound cultural change, with almost the entire 
population displaced and a generation of youngsters brought up in conditions 
that are very far removed from those that enabled the functioning of those 
leadership structures. It seems to bring to the fore the generational aspect that 
is inherent in the conflict, where elders were seen to be ineffective or worse, 
to have abandoned their responsibilities in the first place, at the very start of 
the conflict. Not surprisingly, it is seen by some as an attempt by male adults 
to re-establish control. How much credibility the Acholi people do give to 
these reinvented structures is unclear. The main question perhaps relates to 
how these structures interact with a new generation of outspoken political 
leaders from Acholi - in parliament, in the local councils - and whether it 
allows these political leaders to effectively fill the long-standing leadership 
vacuum through political competition. 
Whatever admiration and/or criticism one may reserve for civil society 
initiatives to help bring an end to the conflict, the government of Uganda 
remains a key player. How to dispel the distrust its actions and statements 
generate is perhaps the main question in establishing a climate conducive 
118 Bradbury,  M.,  1999,  op.cit., 
p.32
119 It  is  useful  at  this  juncture 
to  point  out  how  little  civil 
society  itself  seems  to  base  its 
interventions  upon  a  profound 
anthropological  knowledge  of 
Acholi society. Those documents 
of civil society organisations that 
take the trouble to understand the 
worldview of the LRA and how it 
is  grounded  in  the  local  culture, 
seem exceedingly rare. 46 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 47
to a peace settlement. A number of factors do not seem overly conducive 
to establishing a climate of growing trust. First, it continues to maintain an 
artificial distinction between ‘rebels killed’ on the battlefield by the UPDF 
and ‘children rescued’ from the LRA, although both categories effectively 
cover the same group of abducted children pressed into battle by the LRA. 
Notwithstanding this, in his letter to the editor in the New Vision of 20/06/03, 
president Museveni insists on referring to the rebels as ‘bandits’ and ‘terror-
ists’. At the same time, there are continuing allegations that the UPDF keeps 
on recruiting children for auxiliary forces such as the ‘homeguards’. In its lat-
est report on the LRA conflict, Human Rights Watch calls unambiguously on 
the GoU to apply international standards for escaped, demobilized, and cap-
tured children, and to stop recruiting children for auxiliary forces120. Second, 
it is exceedingly hard to come by trustworthy information on the progress of 
the military campaigns, and independent verification by the press has hardly 
been encouraged by the temporary closure of the Monitor newspaper for 
publishing allegedly false information regarding an army helicopter gunship 
which it reported was shot down. On 20/12/2002 the government stated that 
only 514 LRA fighters were left, and that ‘elimination’ was just a matter of 
weeks away. Taking into account the UPDF’s own tally of rebels killed, only 
210 should have remained by the month of June, when the LRA expanded its 
campaign to the Iteso and West Nile region. Third, in agreeing to talk to the 
LRA as was the case during the cease-fire which the government declared in 
March 2002, the government does not appear to be acting in unison. As one 
person put it, “when the grass is short the government wants to talk, when the 
grass is long the LRA wants to talk” . Some spokespersons strongly advocate 
for a negotiated settlement, while others simultaneously push to ‘meet fire 
with fire’121. As O’Kadameri states with regards to the Betty Bigome - LRA 
talks in 1994, “at no time were the top army leadership including the Presi-
dent, willing to tell Bigombe unambiguously that she was doing the right thing 
and had their full support”122. The appearance and interventions in Gulu of 
a government-sponsored paramilitary force, the ‘Kalangala Action Plan’ of 
former presidential advisor Major Kakooza Mutale, best known for its arm-
twisting interventions during the presidential and parliamentary elections of 
2001, is a show of contempt for the efforts of local authorities to build more 
trust between them and the rural people and throws up questions about the 
sincerity of government in pursuing peace in the North123. Finally, maintain-
ing the ‘state of exception’ -  absence of arrest processes that guarantee fair 
trial and put the judiciary firmly in charge, and of investigations of acts of 
torture and ill-treatment of detainees - as the de facto norm in the Acholi dis-
tricts, cannot enhance a climate conducive to gradual trust-building. Ending 
war means creating justice.
The last point brings us directly to the main dilemma the government 
faces in establishing relations with the LRA, that of balancing human rights, 
justice, and peace. It must for example balance the pursuit of democracy and 
justice and the endeavour of securing the cooperation of those who stand to 
lose from democracy and peace, as it must balance its position against hu-
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man rights abuses without compromising potential links with the LRA. The 
blanket amnesty in place provides for the crimes of the leadership of the LRA 
to be overlooked, so as to incite them to commit to the search for peace. Yet 
experience elsewhere has shown that if serious crimes are not confronted, 
peace and justice remain illusive. Precisely there is where the current am-
nesty provisions under the Amnesty Act remains silent; it does not allow for 
a process of public acknowledgement of offenses committed. In addition, it 
does not consider abuses by security forces against civilians or LRA abduct-
ees pressed into combat. For this reason, the amnesty is considered as an 
asymmetrical instrument in the hands of government. This seems an omi-
nous oversight, given that civil-military relations lie at the heart of the prob-
lem of the northern conflict. An alternative would be to examine the record 
of LRA commanders and senior UPDF officers for the abuses committed via 
a different type of reconciliation process that builds enough consensus about 
justice, along the lines of the South-African experience with its ‘Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’.  
In terms of lowering the opportunity cost for war through raising the 
endowment of economic and human capital, the government and the interna-
tional community have cooperated in a number of programmes, as they are 
now cooperating to rehabilitate economic and social infrastructure under the 
NUSAF framework. The dilemma here is of course the issue of rehabilita-
tion and development in an environment that can only absorb relief aid. Yet 
the issues are pressing, as they concern some of the fundamental internal 
dynamics that sustain the conflict. The children that are being pushed by 
the conflict into early marriages, prostitution, or into government auxiliary 
forces are an example of the need to improve the context of lack of adequate 
economic and educational opportunities. Recapitalizing the economy of the 
North is imperative as well when considering the loss of all cattle. An agro-
pastoral economy can simply not function while the population is confined to 
IDP camps. One of the constraints for example on a modern rendition of the 
traditional reconciliation process or ‘mat oput’ is the difficulty of paying com-
pensation, due to loss of cattle. In addition to official cooperation, the private 
sector definitely has an important role to play. Earlier we already pointed out 
the critical role of the Acholi constituency in the Diaspora, and the reality that 
a significant amount of Uganda’s wealth is still held abroad. To put the poten-
tial of the private sector into perspective, some people would claim that the 
private mobile telecommunications provider MTN has done more to increase 
dialogue amongst the Acholi and between the Acholi districts and the rest of 
Uganda than anybody else, simply by extending their services to the districts 
of Gulu and recently Kitgum. 
 
War was never declared. It is not easy to see the point at which it can 
be considered ended. One can suspect that this will not be the case as long 
as all children are not returned or have not been accounted for. In large traits, 
the situation is now similar to 1986, when the Acholi people stopped expect-
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culpabilization, and turned to their cultural archives to come up with a truly 
unique solution, the Holy Spirit Movement/Mobile Forces. In a sense, as in 
Karamoja, but with its own distinct make-up, it was a definite move towards 
community ownership of security. The traces of this solution which long ago 
succumbed to its own contradictions, cross-bred with UPDA experiences and 
fertilized in a regional setting of cross-border antagonisms, are what brought 
the situation full circle. The need is for an anti-terrorism drive of the highest 
order, an expansive approach of democratic, social and political change by 
non-violent means. Yet fears are that the government will stick to a counter-
terrorism strategy. There is the familiar danger, under the all-encompassing 
banner of `security’, of the further militarization of the polity and a reduction 
in civil liberties. 
  Table 1:  Timeline of the conflict
Dateline UPDA HSMF LRA NRA-UPDF
January 1986 NRA topples Okello governmen
May 1986 Fighting in the North with fleeing UNLA 
troops; Gulu and Kitgum declared war 
zones
August 1986 First incursions by UPDA 
from Sudan
October 1986 HSMF attack Gulu and are 
defeated
November 1986 Alice takes over 150 
troops from UPDA and 
successfully attacks NRA 
at Corner Kilak (Kitgum)
December 1986 Attack against NRA in 
Pajule; from there on to Lira, 
Soroti
February 1987 Kony and his people kidnap 
UPDA divi-sion commanded 
by Okello Okeno; more UPDA   
soldiers joined Kony from 80th 
brigade later
March 1987 First protected camps for civilians 
created in Gulu
June 1987 GoU declares amnesty for rebels willing 
to surrender
July / September 1987 ‘Operation Coy’ to flush out 
UPDA
November 1987 HSMF defeated near Lira Kony attacks UPDA HQ near 
Pawel Owor
January 1988 Alice’s father (Severino 
Lukoya) attempts to con-
tinue HSMF in Kitgum
Kony attacks 115th brigade of 
UPDA and integrates it into 
his force
March 1988 Peace negotiations with 
NRM
Lukoya joins Kony, as well as 
Lukonyomoi of United Uganda 
Godly Movement (UUGM)
Peace negotiations with UPDA
May 1988 Peace treaty with NRM Overall commander of UPDA, 
Odong Latek, joins Kony with 
39 soldiers
Peace treaty with UPDA
June 1988 Start of major operations by NRA against 
remaining rebels
February 1989 Museveni declares 3 month moratorium 
on military operations near Gulu; after 
failure, NRA intensifies assaults and 
moves people back in camps
April 1991 Military ‘operation North’ to end 
insurgency
July 1991 Major revenge killings and 
atrocities against citizens
‘Bow and Arrow’ citizens brigades induced 
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January 1994 Peace talks started, led by 
Betty Bigombe; talks break 
down after President issues 
ultimatum for conclusion in 
7 days
1994 Sudanese support for Kony; 
mass abductions of children 
start
February 1996 Heavy offensive of LRA in 
Gulu
June 1996 Kony spreads the message 
that if Paul Ssemwogere of DP 
becomes president, he will lay 
down arms
Presidential and Parliamentary elections; 
Museveni elected, but receives only 
minority support in Acholi
January 1997 Kony starts a series of heavy 
attacks on Kitgum population; 
into 1999 heavy atrocities by 
LRA against Acholi
Parliament recommends escalation of 
military efforts to end war
March-June 1998 The Acholi Religious 
Leaders Peace Initiative 
present a memorandum 
for peace to Museveni 
and hold Bedo Piny, a 3 
day consultative meeting 
to focus on ending the 
war
September 1998 Amnesty Act is published in Uganda 
Government Gazette
December 1999 Signing of Nairobi Peace Agreement 
between Uganda and Sudan
June 2001 Local peace talks in Gulu 
under auspices of District 
Reconciliation and Peace 
Team (which end in failure)
April 2002 UPDF launches operation ‘Iron Fist’ 
against LRA in Sudanese territory after 
agreement with Government of Sudan; 
this shatters a 2-year period of relative 
peace
Jan 2003 onwards Unilateral cease-fire by LRA, 
responded to with limited 
cease-fire by GoU; nomination 
of Presidential Peace Team and 
attempts to start negotiations; 
large-scale violations and 
failure; expansion of conflict in 
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  Table 2:  Progress in Service Delivery in Government Primary    
      Schools using selected indicators
District Pupil teacher Ratio District Pupil Classroom 
2000 2002 2000 2002
Nakapiripiriti - 81 Yumbe - 189
Kamuli 68 70 Mayuge - 179
Kyenjojo - 69 Pader - 150
Pader - 69 Nakapiripiriti - 132
Bugiri - 66 Arua 184 124
Kitgum 67 64 Iganga 145 123
Kayunga - 63 Apac 112 122
Mayuge - 63 Kitgum 144 119
Nebbi 74 63 Kotido 143 117
Pallisa 75 63 Bugiri - 114
Gulu 76 62 Kyenjojo - 109
Tororo 62 62 Kayunga - 109
Iganga 71 61 Kasese 111 108
Kotido 93 61 Kabarole 104 106
Apac 70 60 Kamuli 114 105
Jinja 63 58 Soroti 146 105
Kalangala 33 58 Bundibugyo 209 105
Bushenyi 67 57 Mbale 103 105
Busia 65 57 Pallisa 164 104
Kamwenge - 57 Jinja 130 103
Arua 90 56 Tororo 132 102
Kabarole 71 56 Mbarara 69 102
Ntungamo 61 56 Kanungu - 100
Sironko - 56 Busia 149 97
Soroti 61 56 Sironko - 95
Yumbe - 56 National Total 106 94
Bundibugyo 68 55 Kiboga 114 94
Kibaale 62 54 Katakwi 109 94
Mbale 64 54 Kalangala 54 93
National Total 65 54 Mubende 101 92
Kumi 59 53 Nebbi 117 91
Mubende 58 53 Gulu 140 91
Kanungu - 52 Kamwenge - 91
Kasese 68 52 Masaka 90 91
Moroto 91 52 Sembabule 102 91
Mpigi 53 52 Ntungamo 88 89
Nakasongola 69 52 Kibaale 95 87
Hoima  63 51 Kumi 121 87
Luwero 63 51 Nakasongola 127 86
Mbarara 55 51 Mpigi 81 84
Kisoro 68 50 Kapchorwa 147 83
Lira 53 50 Mukono 103 82
Adjumani 67 49 Rakai 91 82
Kiboga 64 49 Masindi 104 81
Moyo 68 49 Moroto 174 78
Katakwi 67 48 Kabale 73 77
Masindi 73 47 Kisoro 91 76
Kabale 57 46 Lira 78 75
Kapchorwa 68 46 Bushenyi 75 74
Rukungiri 59 46 Hoima 81 72
Kampala 51 45 Luwero 99 72
Mukono 59 45 Wakiso - 71
Masaka 59 43 Rukungiri 75 65
Sembabule 55 42 Kampala 83 61
Wakiso - 42 Adjumani 89 59
Rakai 61 37 Moyo 82 58
Source: Ministry of Education and Sports Factfiles 2000 and 200250 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 51
  Table 3:  Rural Safe Water coverage in Northern Uganda
      and other districts during 2000 - 2002 (%)






















National Average 49.9 54.8
Source:  DWD; Water Sector Review, Sept 200252 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-06 • 53
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